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TOWARD CYBERPEACE: MANAGING
CYBERATTACKS THROUGH POLYCENTRIC
GOVERNANCE
SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD∗
Views range widely about the seriousness of cyberattacks and the likelihood
of cyberwar. But even framing cyberattacks within the context of a loaded
category like war can be an oversimplification that shifts focus away from
enhancing cybersecurity against the full range of threats now facing
companies, countries, and the international community. Current methods are
proving ineffective at managing cyberattacks, and, as cybersecurity legislation
is being debated in the U.S. Congress and around the world, the time is ripe for
a fresh look at this critical topic. This Article searches for alternative avenues
to foster cyberpeace by applying a novel conceptual framework termed
polycentric governance. Proponents such as Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom
have championed the theory, which promotes self-organization and networking
regulations at multiple levels to address global collective action problems. Such
a framework contrasts with the increasingly state-centric approach to both
Internet governance and cybersecurity preferred by a growing list of nations.
This Article will use the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
∗ Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School
of Business. This Article is based on the author’s 2011 doctoral dissertation. Scott J.
Shackelford, Governing the Global Commons in International Law and Relations
(Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge) (on file with
University Library, University of Cambridge). Portions of this analysis will be published
in book-form under Chapters 1, 2, and 7 of SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER
ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE
(forthcoming June 2013). The Article should also be considered as a comparative
case study to Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden Right?: The Expansion of Closed Seas and
Its Consequences, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011). The author wishes to thank the late,
great Professor Elinor Ostrom, as well as Richard Clarke, Michael DuBose, Greg
Rattray, and Professors Fred Cate, David Fidler, and Anjanette Raymond among
others for their comments, suggestions, and insights on developing portions of this
argument. Finally, thanks to Cambridge University Press for granting permission to
adapt this material for this publication, and for the invaluable research support of
Amanda Craig, Evan Sarosi, and Selvanayagam Rangasamy.
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Numbers (ICANN) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as case
studies, as well as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as an
illustrative example to explore different governance models and some of their
security implications. Ultimately, the case is made that polycentric analysis
may provide new insights about how to reconceptualize both cybersecurity and
the future of Internet governance.
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“We have a faith-based approach [to cybersecurity],
in that we pray every night nothing bad will happen.”
–James Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies1
INTRODUCTION
Epsilon and its customers, including JPMorgan Chase, Verizon,
Sony, the International Monetary Fund, Sega, Citigroup, and more,
were hit by cyberattacks in just three months, from April to June
2011.2 More recently, in March 2013 what has been billed as the
“biggest cyberattack in history” impacted service for millions of
Internet users around the world,3 the same month as South Korean
banks and broadcasters were hit by attacks purportedly coming from
North Korea.4 What do these events have in common? Each reveals
some of the many facets of “cyberattacks,” defined by the U.S.
National Research Council as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt,
deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the
information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems
or networks.”5 Given the ubiquity of the Internet, how can we better

1. Ken Dilanian, Privacy Group Sues To Get Records About NSA-Google Relationship,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/14/business/la-finsa-google-20100914.
2. See, e.g., Johnathan Davis, Hackers Gone Wild: Sega Joins Growing List of Victims, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (June 18, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/hackers-gone-wild-sega-joins-growing-list-victims291765; David Goldman, Mass E-mail Breach: Just How Bad Is It?, CNNMONEY (Apr. 6, 2011,
3:09 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/06/technology/epsilon_breach/index.htm
(listing the prominent companies impacted by a data breach that leaked its customers’
email addresses); Scott J. Shackelford, Should Your Firm Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?,
55 BUS. HORIZONS 349 (July-Aug. 2012) (representing an earlier form of this research).
3. See Doug Gross, Massive Cyberattack Hits Internet Users, CNN (Mar. 29, 2013,
7:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/tech/massive-internet-attack.
4. See South Korea Hit by Massive Cyber Attack, PBS (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/extra/2013/04/south-korea-hit-hard-by-massive-cyber-attack.
5. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND
ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A.
Owens et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMIES]. Some engineers prefer
“information technology” and refer more directly to networks, hardware, and software. See,
e.g., Daria Stepanova et al., A Knowledge Base for Justified Information Security Decision-Making
2.4, (Newcastle Univ. Working Paper No. CS-TR-1137, 2009) (differentiating technical
vulnerabilities—those dealing with hardware and software—from “human-behavioral”
vulnerabilities—those involving failures of human organization). However, in line with the
National Academies, this Article uses “cyber” terminology. See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra,
at 10–11 (defining “cyberattack” and “cyberexploitation”).
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enhance cybersecurity across networks and borders? A great deal of
uncertainty and debate pervades this question, and the stakes are
high. How the cyberthreat is managed will affect everything from
U.S. national and international security to the competitiveness of
firms and the future of Internet governance.6
Difficulties stem in part from the rate of technological
advancement,7 as well as geopolitical divides and legal ambiguities.
Throughout the long and tumultuous history of conflict, new
technologies have revolutionized both battlefields and businesses,
either gradually, as with gunpowder or the Industrial Revolution, or
abruptly, as with nuclear fission. Information technology (IT) is no
exception. Networked computers have given tremendous advantages
to and demonstrated vulnerabilities of the cyberpowers, including
China, Israel, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.8
These nations can now launch sophisticated cyberattacks, but their
own militaries, economies, and critical national infrastructures (CNI)
are also vulnerable.9 The rise of new cyberpowers underscores the
shift in international relations after the Cold War from a bipolar
world order dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union to
a multipolar order featuring more emerging power centers.10 This
6. Part of the cyberthreat is the so-called “cybersecurity dilemma,” which
signifies that both strengths and weaknesses in national security can be provocative to
other nations, and that “efforts by states to enhance their security can decrease the
security of” other states. See Nicholas C. Rueter, The Cybersecurity Dilemma iv, 15
(2011)
(unpublished
M.A.
thesis,
Duke
University),
available
at
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/3793/Rueter_duk
e_0066N_10959.pdf?sequence=1 (revealing how moves by both Russia and Estonia to
enhance their respective cybersecurity measures aggravated each other).
Cooperation to enhance cybersecurity is made more difficult by this security
dilemma. See id. at 29–31 (arguing that the security dilemma frustrates its own
resolution).
7. An example of this rapid technological advancement is the continued
relevance of Moore’s Law, the prediction by Intel Co-founder Gordon Moore that
“the number of transistors on a chip will double approximately every two years.”
Moore’s Law Inspires Intel Innovation, http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/siliconinnovations/moores-law-technology.html.
8. See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, Massive Cyberattack: Act 1 of Israeli Strike on Iran?, NPR
(Aug. 24, 2012, 3:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/24/159959300/massivecyberattack-act-1-of-israeli-strike-on-iran (highlighting Israel’s increased military
and strategic power obtained by possessing destructive cyberattack
capabilities).
9. See, e.g., Dennis Fisher & Paul Roberts, U.S. House Committee Questions Ability
To Secure Wall Street Data, THREATPOST (July 14, 2011, 1:54 PM),
http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/us-house-committee-questions-ability-securewall-street-data-071411 (discussing how the United States, despite its advanced ability
to launch a cyberattack, has failed to adequately protect its data from outside
attacks).
10. But see Richard N. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S.
Dominance, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2008, at 44, 44 (arguing that the twenty-first
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shift complicates international efforts to reach consensus on
improving cybersecurity through multilateral organizations such as
the United Nations,11 hampering policymaking just as the political
and economic costs of the cyberthreat mount.12
Managing cyberattacks is made more difficult by the multifaceted
nature of these incidents.13 A serious cyberattack may damage
military command or information systems or interrupt electrical
power or financial services.14 Consider the power grid. In 2007, a
logic bomb was reportedly identified that could have disrupted U.S.
electrical systems.15 Many power plants tend not to keep expensive
replacement parts on hand, meaning that it could take some weeks to
century is no longer dominated by two actors, but rather by the emergence of “a
nonpolar international system . . . characterized by numerous centers with
meaningful power”); Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of the Rest, NEWSWEEK (May 3, 2008,
10:24 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/05/03/the-rise-of-therest.html (conveying the perceived sentiment that the United States no longer
dominates in many areas seen to denote global power). The list of burgeoning
cyberpowers includes France, which is seeking to develop its offensive cyberattack
capabilities. See Valéry Marchive, Cyberdefence to Become Cyber-attack as France Gets Ready
to go on the Offensive, ZDNET (May 3, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/cyberdefence-tobecome-cyber-attack-as-france-gets-ready-to-go-on-the-offensive-7000014878/.
11. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD 10
(1995) (observing that the new global structure has altered the way the global
community can and does react to international problems); Danielle Kelh & Tim
Maurer, Did the U.N. Internet Governance Summit Actually Accomplish Anything?, SLATE
(Dec. 14, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/12/14/wcit
_2012_has_ended_did_the_u_n_internet_governance_summit_accomplish_anything
.html (illustrating how attempts by Russia and Iran to increase governmental control
of the Internet irritated other nations and hindered the U.N.’s efforts to reach an
international consensus).
12. See REIN MULLERSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS:
DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS 38, 40 (1994) (discussing the shifting
character of international relations after the end of the Cold War); Mark MacCarthy,
What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing About Online Liability and Why It Matters, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1114 (2010) (analyzing the potential for a tragedy of the
cybercommons); Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of
Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, at A1 (detailing U.S. Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta’s warning on the potential danger looming from a cyberattack and
articulating how such an attack could compromise U.S. infrastructure).
13. See Cyberwar:
War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (associating the seriousness of the
threats of cyberattacks with the transformation to organized hacking missions and
the increased reliance on cybertechnologies).
14. James A. Lewis, The “Korean” Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber
Conflict, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 1 (Oct. 23, 2009), http://csis.org/publication/
korean-cyber-attacks-and-their-implications-cyber-conflict.
15. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 8, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html; Robert
Mullins, Bracing for a Cybersecurity Pearl Harbor: RSA Panel Says Not Enough Is Being Done
To Protect Cyberspace, NETWORK WORLD (Mar. 5, 2010, 3:54 PM),
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/58224 (explaining how Russia
and China’s penetration of electrical grids used an exploit called “logic bombs,”
which are software programs that can be executed to disrupt such a system).
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fix a widespread outage.16 According to The Economist, “[o]ne senior
American military source said that if any country were found to be
planting logic bombs on the grid, it would provoke the equivalent of
the Cuban missile crisis.”17 But no one knows for sure how many
logic bombs exist, who planted them, or what the legal, economic, or
political ramifications might be.18
Cyberattacks are often broken down into four main categories:
criminal activity, espionage, terrorism, and cyberwarfare.19 But it is
no simple matter to categorize cyberattacks in this manner;
motivations can overlap and targets abound in cyberspace. For
example, there has been a spate of high-profile cases of cybercrime
and espionage, as well as alleged state-sponsored cyberattacks
involving criminal organizations and terrorist groups targeting both
public and private sectors.20 Cyberattacks against states in particular
are increasingly common and serious, as seen in Estonia in 2007,
16. See Brian Wingfield, Power-Grid Cyber Attack Seen Leaving Millions in Dark for
Months, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201202-01/cyber-attack-on-u-s-power-grid-seen-leaving-millions-in-dark-for-months.html
(recognizing that the extent of destruction caused by a hacker infiltrating a power
grid could leave customers without power for up to a year and a half). U.S. power
systems may become more vulnerable to logic-bomb planting due to the rise of
Internet-connected smart grids called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) networks. See Kim Zetter, Report: Critical Infrastructures Under Constant
Cyberattack Globally, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel
/2010/01/csis-report-on-cybersecurity (revealing how these SCADA networks can be
useful for enhancing efficiency and promoting renewable power, but can also
increase the danger to critical national infrastructure).
17. Cyberwar, supra note 13, at 28.
18. Part of the reason for this state of affairs is that the United States has more
than 3200 independent power utilities, unlike Germany, for example, which has four
major electrical providers. See CHRISTIAN SCHÜLKE, THE EU’S MAJOR ELECTRICITY AND
GAS UTILITIES SINCE MARKET LIBERALIZATION 130 (2010) (determining that
approximately 90% of German electricity is produced by one of four main utility
firms); W.M. WARWICK, PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES,
DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 2.1 (2002)
(surveying the landscape of electrical utility ownership in the United States).
19. See, e.g., SCOTT CHARNEY, MICROSOFT CORP., RETHINKING THE CYBER THREAT: A
FRAMEWORK AND PATH FORWARD 5 (2009), available at http://www.microsoft.com/downloads
/en/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=062754cc-be0e-4bab-a181-077447f66877.
20. See, e.g., Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik, Introductory Chapter, in CYBER
WARFARE AND CYBER TERRORISM, xiii, xxvii (Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik
eds., 2008) (speaking generally of the increase in cyberattacks at the end of the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, particularly focused on the
private sector); David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in
Cyberstrikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/broad
-powers-seen-for-obama-in-cyberstrikes.html (noting that the U.S. government has
increased its readiness for cyberattacks given the growing threat to the public sector);
Ian Steadman, Reports Find China Still Largest Source of Hacking and Cyber Attacks, WIRED
(Apr. 24, 2013) http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/24/akamai-state-ofthe-internet (discussing reports alleging that China is the source of more than 30%
of global cyberattacks).
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Georgia in 2008, Iran in 2010, and South Korea in 2013.21 U.S.
government networks are also being targeted. In 2010, Senator
Susan Collins reported that U.S. government websites were attacked
more than 1.8 billion times per month.22 But while headlines are
often devoted to major breaches resulting in the theft of millions of
dollars, many cyberattacks go unreported. For example, one 2010
Symantec study reported that 75% of companies have experienced
cyberattacks costing large businesses with 500 or more employees an
average of $2 million annually,23 though issues surrounding the lack
of verifiable data as well as Symantec’s stake in the cybersecurity
market makes some question these statistics’ accuracy.
Current methods are proving ineffective at managing cyberattacks.
Preventing attacks requires comprehensive, proactive, and vigorous
use of cybersecurity best practices at the local, national, and global
levels to manage cyberattacks more effectively and hold those who
launch them accountable. This is not the first time that technology
has raced ahead of both military doctrine and international law.
Nuclear weapons were developed in 1945, but it was not until the
early 1960s that Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn
and the other “Wizards of Armageddon” created the theory of
mutually assured destruction,24 while the International Court of
Justice did not rule on the legality of nuclear weapons until 1996.25
The same evolution is now occurring in cyberspace, and the nuclear
21. See, e.g., John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2008, at A1 (reporting on the cyberattack on Georgia); Joshua Davis, Hackers Take
Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.wired.com
/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia (discussing the cyberattack on
Estonia); Grant Gross, Experts: Stuxnet Changed the Cybersecurity Landscape, PC WORLD
(Nov. 17, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/210971/article.html
(arguing that a cybersecurity threat in Iran “illustrates the need for governments and
businesses to adopt new approaches to cyberthreats”); Mihoko Matsubara, Lessons
from the Cyber-Attacks on South Korea, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/03/26/commentary/lessons-from-thecyber-attacks-on-south-korea/#.UW9fdII8xPk (relaying the disruptions caused by the
attacks on South Korea).
22. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, Senator Collins’ Statement on Cyber Attack (Mar. 18, 2011), available
at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/senator-collins-statement-oncyber-attack.
23. See SYMANTEC, STATE OF ENTERPRISE SECURITY 2010 7, 9 (2010), available at
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/presskits/SES_report_Feb2010.pdf
(surveying the extent to which large U.S. businesses are targets of cyberattacks).
24. FRED KAPLAN, THE WIZARDS OF ARMAGEDDON 248–49 (1983) (marking the
point in history at the start of the Kennedy Administration when it became clear to
experts that the escalation of nuclear weaponry raised the potential of both nations
destroying each other).
25. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 105 (July 8).
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analogy has not been lost on victim states.26 Fears of a doomsday
“electronic Pearl Harbor” may well be overblown, but the general
need for enhanced cybersecurity is not.27 Yet the debate over how to
defend against cyberwar and promote cyberpeace is one that many
nations wish to avoid, having “found mutual benefit in a status quo of
strategic ambiguity.”28
Assessments of the likelihood of cyberwar range widely. Some,
such as Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence,
envision the potential for a catastrophic breakdown.29 Others, like
Howard Schmidt, the former Cybersecurity Coordinator of the
Obama Administration, argue that an apocalyptic cyberattack against
the United States is implausible.30 The truth about the risk posed by
cyberattacks is somewhere in between “weapons of mass disruption—as
[President] Barack Obama dubbed cyberattacks in 2009” and
“weapons of mass distraction.”31 Framing cyberattacks within the
context of a loaded category like war can be an oversimplification
that shifts focus away from enhancing cybersecurity against the full
range of threats now facing companies, countries, and the
international community. The hype over cyberwar may be based on
real vulnerabilities, but getting carried away by fear of one aspect of
this evolving threat matrix can lead to misdirected investments and
ill-suited policies.32 Instead of worrying about “dystopian futures and
26. See Kevin Poulsen, ‘Cyberwar’ and Estonia’s Panic Attack, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2007,
3:51 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/08/cyber-war-and-e/ (reporting
that Ene Ergma, a scientist and member of the Estonian Parliament, has made the
comparison regarding cyberwar stating that “[w]hen I look at a nuclear explosion and
the explosion that happened in our country in May [2007], I see the same thing”).
27. See, e.g., Alfred Hermida, Doomsday Fears of Terror Cyber-Attacks, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2001, 9:10 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1593018.stm
(translating the fear of cyberattacks by terrorists following September 11, 2001 into
calls for action to increase cybersecurity).
28. REX B. HUGHES, NATO AND CYBER DEFENCE: MISSION ACCOMPLISHED? 3
(2009), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/NATO%20and%
20Cyber%20Defence.pdf.
29. See Mike McConnell, Mike McConnell on How To Win the Cyber-War We’re Losing,
WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html.
30. See Cyberwar, supra note 13; see also PETER SOMMER & IAN BROWN, ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK 7 (2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/42/46894657.pdf (arguing that “true cyberwar”
involving almost no kinetic element is unlikely); Jeffrey Carr, OECD’s Cyber Report Misses
Key Facts, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2011, 9:33 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/jeffreycarr/2011/01
/19/oecds-cyber-report-misses-key-facts/ (explaining why a true cyberwar remains
relatively unlikely).
31. Evgeny Morozov, Battling the Cyber Warmongers, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704370704575228653351323986.html.
32. In this context, a “threat matrix” refers to a framework constituting the
myriad cyber threats faced by companies, countries, and the international
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limitless vulnerabilities,”33 we should be focused on proactively
addressing concrete vulnerabilities, understanding better how the
cyberthreat is developing, and buttressing public- and private-sector
defenses to better manage cyberattacks and secure some measure of
cyberpeace. Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, Jr., among others, has
called for this type of constructive dialogue.34 For example, framing
the topic of cybersecurity in light of cyberpeace, not war, can help
reframe the debate toward creating a “global culture of
cybersecurity.”35
To date, attempts to define “cyberpeace” have been somewhat
underwhelming.
The International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), a U.N. agency for information technologies, has defined
“cyber peace” as “‘a universal order of cyberspace’” built on a
“wholesome state of tranquility, the absence of disorder or
disturbance and violence.”36 Although certainly desirable, such an
outcome is politically unlikely.
Instead, this Article defines
cyberpeace not as the absence of conflict, but as the creation of a
network of multilevel regimes working together to promote global
cybersecurity by clarifying norms for companies and countries alike
to reduce the risk of conflict, crime, and espionage in cyberspace to
levels comparable to other business and national security risks. To
achieve this goal, a new approach to cybersecurity is needed that
seeks out best practices from the public and private sectors to build
robust, secure systems and evaluates cybersecurity within the larger
debate on Internet governance.
Much of the existing literature offers a false choice between
cyberspace being considered a traditional commons or an extension
of national territory,37 between the need for a grand cyberspace treaty
community from sophisticated zero-day exploits launched by nation-states to DDoS
attacks from hactivist groups.
33. Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp, Executive Summary, in 1 AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7, 8 (Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp
eds., 2011).
34. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber War and Peace, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cyber-war-and-peace
(contending
that the man-made cyberlandscape needs to be better understood in order to
appropriately allocate resources).
35. Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 77 (Int’l
Telecomm. Union & Permanent Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec. eds., 2011), available
at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf.
36. Id. at 78.
37. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 519 (2003) (depicting cyberspace as a traditional
common and warning that inaction will lead to an intractable digital anticommons);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
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and a state-centric approach,38 between governments being regulators
or resources for at-risk companies,39 between Internet sovereignty and
Internet freedom,40 and ultimately, between cyberwar and
cyberpeace.41 This Article attempts to navigate a middle ground
between these competing camps and seeks out new models to help
build consensus. For example, instead of a traditional area of the
“global commons” existing beyond national jurisdiction, this Article
argues—in the same vein as James Lewis, among others—that
cyberspace is at best a “pseudocommons” given the realities of private
and governmental control.42 Whereas certain principles of commons
analysis such as collective action problems and the tragedy of the

STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that “[g]lobal computer-based
communications cut across territorial borders, creating a new realm of human
activity and undermining the feasibility—and legitimacy—of laws based on
geographic boundaries”).
38. See, e.g., Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?, 64 A.F. L.
REV 1, 41 (2009) (discussing the tension between nations wanting global
involvement, but concerned that such action would decrease national sovereignty);
Rex Hughes, A Treaty for Cyberspace, 86 INT’L AFF. 523, 541 (2010) (expressing the
unique advantages of using international treaties to protect cyberspace).
39. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 662 (2011)
(warning that governments should be prepared to shoulder some of the private
sector costs of cyberwarfare); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government
Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in
Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 503 (1997) (expressing the contention
between private sector “Cyberian elites” and government outsiders who impose
regulations); Grant Gross, Lawmaker: New Cybersecurity Regulations Needed, PC WORLD
(Mar. 10, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/161023/article.html
(conveying the opinions of lawmakers that the U.S. government needs to impose
regulations on private firms to enhance national cybersecurity).
40. See Press Release, Ind. Univ., London Conference Reveals ‘Fault Lines’ in
Global Cyberspace and Cybersecurity Governance (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/normal/20236.html (highlighting the tension
between civil liberties and regulations online); see also Johnson & Post, supra note 37,
at 1367 (arguing that cyberspace would foster regulatory arbitrage and undermine
traditional hierarchically structured systems of control); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of
the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507–08 (1999)
(introducing the concept of regulatory modalities and their effects both within and
outside of cyberspace); Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty?—The Internet and
the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 650–51 (1997) (asserting how states
can regulate the content of the Internet through regulations affecting access and
hardware).
41. Cf. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 31 (2010) (noting the blurring of the
lines between peace and war in cyberspace).
42. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 3 & n.4 (defining the idea of the pseudocommons,
as first outlined by U.S. State Department coordinator for issues Christopher Painter,
as a space “where owners have granted the right of way to any and all traffic as long
as it does not impose costs or damages upon them”); Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind:
Free Software and the Death of Proprietary Culture, 56 ME. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 6 (2004) (tracing
the brief history of information sharing on the Internet and the perception that
information sharing should act largely as a societal right).
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commons scenario arguably apply to cyberspace, they manifest in
Drawing from this interdisciplinary literature,
distinct ways.43
however, provides insights on how we might better govern this
unique space to promote cybersecurity.
This Article argues that a novel analytical framework is needed to
reconceptualize Internet governance in order to better manage
cyberattacks and ultimately secure cyberpeace and that this search
should include an examination of polycentric regulation.44
According to Professor Michael McGinnis, “[t]he basic idea [of
polycentric governance] is that any group . . . facing some collective
problem should be able to address that problem in whatever way they
best see fit.”45 This could include using existing governance
structures or crafting new systems.46 In other words, “[a] system of
governance is fully polycentric if it facilitates creative problem-solving
This multilevel, multipurpose, multitype, and
at all levels.”47
multisectoral model,48 championed by scholars including Nobel
Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom, challenges
orthodoxy by demonstrating the benefits of self-organization,
networking regulations “at multiple scales,”49 and the extent to which

43. Collective action problems are a classic “social dilemma.” Elinor Ostrom, A
Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 6 (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/
2009/04268.pdf. People tend to maximize their short-term personal interests
instead of the collective good. This is a dilemma, in economic terms, since there is
“at least one outcome [that] yields higher returns for all who are involved, but
participants posited as maximizing short-term material benefits make independent
choices and are not predicted to achieving this outcome.” Id.
44. This argument is built on the work of numerous scholars, including Professor
Andrew Murray’s analysis of polycentric cyberregulation. See ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE
REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 47–52 (2007)
(defining polycentric regulation as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of external controls, whether state or non-state, intended or unintended”).
45. Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1 (Vincent & Elinor Ostrom
Workshop in Political Theory & Pol’y Analysis, Ind. Univ., Working Paper W11–3,
2011), available at http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/Beijing_core.pdf.
46. Id. at 1–2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. See Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163, 171–72 (2011)
(defining “polycentricity” as “a system of governance in which authorities from
overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the
conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these
jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their
activities for public purposes”).
49. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action Problems 2
(Vincent & Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Ind. Univ.,
Working Paper No. 08–6, 2008), available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/
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national and private control can coexist with communal
management. It also posits that, because of the problem of free
riders in a multipolar world, “a single governmental unit” is often
incapable of managing “global collective action problems,”50 such as
cyberattacks. Instead, a polycentric approach recognizes that diverse
organizations and governments working at multiple levels can create
policies that increase levels of cooperation and compliance,
enhancing “flexibility across issues and adaptability over time.”51 This
form of governance contrasts with the increasingly state-centric
approach to both Internet governance and cybersecurity preferred by
a growing list of nations.52 This approach has the promise of moving
us beyond common classifications of cybersecurity challenges,
recognizing that cyberspace is uniquely dynamic and malleable and
that its “stratified . . . structure [underscores] a particularly complex
regulatory environment, . . . [making] . . . mapping or forecasting”
the effects of regulations “especially difficult.”53
Polycentric
regulation then is not a “keep it simple, stupid” response,54 but a
multifaceted approach in keeping with the complexity of the crises in
cyberspace. Considering cybersecurity through this lens takes the
debate about how to address cybersecurity challenges in a potentially
more productive direction, helping to eschew false choices,
challenging all relevant stakeholders to take action, and providing a
more robust conceptual framework.
Given that polycentric
regulation has already been applied to both regulations of cyberspace
generally and global collective action problems such as climate

handle/10535/4417/W08-6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf (touting the benefits of individual
contributions to the larger goal of comprehensive cybersecurity).
50. Id. at 35.
51. Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change,
9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 9 (2011); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008)
(discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes, and arguing that “[a]ll regulatory
regimes are polycentric to varying degrees”).
52. However, it should be noted that, as is discussed infra Part II, national
regulations are becoming an increasingly common feature of the cyber regime
complex writ large. It is thus important to analyze these regulations and attempt to
identify best practices that could, in time, give rise to norms and eventually be
codified into international law. Subsequent research will explore this topic through
the use of comparative case studies.
53. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 52–53 (noting the lingering uncertainty pertaining
to even the most thought-out regulations).
54. Jeffrey Weiss, Elinor Ostrom and the Triumph of the Commons, POL. DAILY (Oct. 14,
2009), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/10/14/elinor-ostrom-and-the-triumph-of-thecommons.
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change particularly, the time is ripe to investigate the lessons this
approach offers for enhancing cybersecurity.55
This Article is structured as follows. Part I investigates the nature
of cyberspace, including whether it might be considered a
pseudocommons amenable to some form of the tragedy of the
commons and anticommons scenarios. Part II then discusses the
solutions to the tragedy of the commons dilemma, including
nationalization, privatization, and common property systems. This
Part also investigates how the evolution of Internet governance is
impacting cybersecurity using the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) as case studies, and the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) as an illustrative example. Finally, Part III analyzes
cybersecurity as a collective action problem, detailing the extent to
which polycentric regulation can help better manage cyberattacks,
and discussing what this all means for policymakers.
I.

THE CYBERTHREAT IN THE PSEUDOCOMMONS

Cyberattacks seem to be proliferating in number, sophistication,
and severity just as our means of managing them more effectively is
beginning to fracture. This is partially because ideological divides
over Internet governance are generating legal, economic, and
governance challenges as well as opportunities for experimenting
with regulatory frameworks. Finding solutions to cybersecurity
challenges requires collaboration between technical communities,
the private sector, governments, and intergovernmental
organizations, but fostering cooperation between these stakeholders
can be difficult. Worst-case-scenario cyberattacks could force diverse
groups over the elusive tipping point into coordinated action, but
that could come too late, if at all.
Although the Internet was originally managed by only a handful of
researchers, today, thousands of entities—including companies,
organizations, and governments—have a stake in regulating
cyberspace, together forming a “regime complex,” meaning “a
collective of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical regimes” that
vary in extent and purpose.56 This complexity makes addressing
55. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 53 (emphasizing that, despite the uncertainty,
cyberregulations can and do have a place in managing this frontier); Ostrom, supra
note 43.
56. See Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 277 (2004) (defining a “regime complex”).
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questions of governance, such as whether a new cybercrime treaty is
necessary, more difficult. It also provides an opportunity to take, in
the words of Robert Knake, director at Good Harbor Consulting, “a
networked and distributed approach to a networked and distributed
problem.”57 The issue of cybersecurity is increasingly driving debates
about Internet governance. Being among the most important and
difficult issues in this field, promoting cybersecurity is a crucial test
for the emerging cyber-regime complex.58
This Part begins by exploring the nature of cyberspace and the
extent to which it can be considered part of the global commons. It
then moves on to consider the applicability of the tragedy of the
commons and anticommons models and how they are manifesting in
cyberspace. Finally, the cyberthreat in Internet governance is
introduced in order to provide context for the discussion in Part II of
managing cyberattacks within a polycentric framework.
A. What Is Cyberspace?
Academics, the popular press, and governments around the world
have tried to define cyberspace. None have fully succeeded, though
governmental definitions often share two common features. First,
cyberspace is commonly conflated with the Internet as a global
network of hardware,59 emphasizing the critical infrastructure
concerns of governments.
Second, cyberspace has been
conceptualized as a domain to be dominated.60 The task of defining
cyberspace is made more complicated given the fact that it is always
evolving. Its content is consolidating due to the influence of semi-

57. ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN
AN AGE OF CYBER INSECURITY 3 (2010), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications
/attachments/Cybersecurity_CSR56.pdf.
58. See Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2 CLIMATE L.
395, 412 (2011) (arguing that certain “regime complex[es]” are analogous to
polycentric governance).
59. See, e.g., DAVID BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERCULTURES 7 (2001); see also
Damir Rajnovic, Cyberspace–What Is It?, CISCO BLOG (July 26, 2012, 8:25 AM),
http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cyberspace-what-is-it. (reviewing some of the
similarities and differences between how a subset of countries define “cyberspace,”
with one definition being the hardware that forms the backbone of the Internet).
60. See, e.g., Robert A. Miller & Daniel T. Kuehl, Cyberspace and the “First Battle” in
21st-Century War, 68 DEF. HORIZONS 1, 1–3 (2009), available at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP
/docUploaded/DH68.pdf (revealing that the arena of cyberwarfare resembles
traditional warfare in that nations compete for superiority and control); Army Cyber,
U.S. ARMY CYBER COMMAND, http://www.arcyber.army.mil/org-arcyber.html (last
visited June. 15, 2013) (discussing network dominance and stating that “[i]t is in
cyberspace that we must use our strategic vision to dominate the information
environment throughout interdependencies and independent systems”).
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closed platforms just as its reach is expanding.61 Compete, a web
analytics company, found that “the top ten Web sites accounted for
31% of U.S. pageviews in 2001, 40% in 2006, and about 75% in
2010.”62 Consumers favor semi-closed, proprietary networks, like
those common in many smartphones, due to their ease of use, while
companies favor these networks since they can make it simpler to
make a profit.63 According to Wired Magazine, fast is beating flexible.64
As cyberspace evolves, it is becoming “flat,”65 and many
organizations are working to make it flatter still. The United Nations,
for example, is helping to spread Internet technology to Africa, while
the Secretary General of the ITU Hamadoun Touré has argued that
governments must regard the Internet as “basic infrastructure—just
like roads, waste, and water.”66 A 2011 U.N. report argued—as have
the countries of Spain, France, and Finland—that Internet access is a
basic human right, even though practitioners, including Vinton Cerf,
the “Father of the Internet,” have taken issue with this position.67
Moreover, fast Internet connections in nations with weak governance
increases the risk that these nations will become havens for
cybercriminals,68 showcasing both the benefits and drawbacks of the
strong growth in online services on Internet governance and
cybersecurity. As access spreads, cyberspace itself, defined here as a
“set of interconnected information systems and the human users who
interact with these systems,”69 remains malleable. But is cyberspace
61. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 3
(2008) (discussing the “rise and stall” of the generative Internet).
62. Chris Anderson & Michael Wolff, The Web is Dead. Long Live the Internet, WIRED
MAG., Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/08/ff_webrip.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY WE NEED A GREEN
REVOLUTION—AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 29–30 (2008) (describing how the
spread of the personal computer, Internet, Internet browsers, and software and
transmission protocols that allow people all over the world to work together have led
to a dramatic flattening of the world); see also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS
FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 163 (2005) (explaining how the
capabilities, power, and speed of computing have increased dramatically in a short
amount of time).
66. Internet Access Is ‘a Fundamental Right,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:52 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm.
67. See Vinton G. Cerf, Op-Ed, Internet Access Is Not a Human Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2012, at A25 (arguing that the Internet enables people to seek their human rights,
but access to the Internet in and of itself is not a human right).
68. See Cybercriminals in Developing Nations Targeted, BBC NEWS, (July 20, 2012, 1:41
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18930953 (pointing out that enhanced
interconnectivity often means increased criminal activity).
69. Rain Ottis & Peeter Lorents, Cyberspace: Definition and Implications, 2010 INT’L
CONF. ON INFO. WARFARE & SEC. 267, 268 (emphasis omitted); see also Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
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really a commons?70 If so, what are the implications for cybersecurity
policymaking?
B. Introducing the Global Commons
A “commons” is a general term meaning “a resource shared by a
group of people.”71 Under international law, “commons” are the
exception, not the rule, given that territorial sovereignty has in large
part defined international relations and international law since the
1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ushered in the modern nation-state
system.72 The notion of the global commons posits that there are
limits to national sovereignty in certain parts of the world that should
be open to use by the international community and closed to
exclusive appropriation by treaty or custom.73 At its height, the
global commons comprised nearly 75% of the Earth’s surface,
including the high seas and Antarctica, as well as outer space, the
atmosphere, and some argue, cyberspace.74 Some of these regions
dissenting in part) (describing how cyberspace differs from the physical world,
specifically noting its “malleable” nature); Cyberspace as a Warfighting Domain: Policy,
Management and Technical Challenges to Mission Assurance: Hearing Before the Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats, & Capabilities Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 111th
Cong. 96 n.1 (2009) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, Commander, Joint
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare) (explaining that cyberspace
is “the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and
includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers in critical industries” (quoting National
Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Jan.
8, 2008))).
70. See Ronald Deibert, Cybersecurity: The New Frontier, in FOR. POL’Y ASS’N GREAT
DECISIONS 2012, at 45, 56–57 (2012) (questioning the use of the term commons in
relation to cyberspace because up to 90% of cyberspace is privately owned).
71. Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge
Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3
(Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007).
72. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 20, 26
(1948) (attributing the beginning of modern international law to the Peace of
Westphalia, which established the principle of state sovereignty).
73. See CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS: THE
ANTARCTIC REGIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 222 (1998) (defining a global
commons and positing that Antarctica may qualify as a global commons suitable to
the application of the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) concept); Geert van
Calster, International Law and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, INT’L L. & INST., at
2–3, available at http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-36-01-04.pdf; see also
Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer
Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?, 21
WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 411–13 (2003) (discussing the CHM, in which all of humanity is
theoretically sovereign over the international commons).
74. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT
12 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf;
MARK E. REDDEN & MICHAEL P. HUGHES, NAT’L DEF. UNIV., SF NO. 259, GLOBAL
COMMONS AND DOMAIN INTERRELATIONSHIPS:
TIME FOR A NEW CONCEPTUAL
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were gradually regulated to a greater or lesser extent not by
individual countries, but by the international community through the
vague Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) concept discussed
below.75 More recently, this trend has reversed itself such as in the
seabed, with coastal nations rather than the international community
asserting increasing control over the vast majority of readily accessible
offshore resources.76 The same trend might be playing out in
cyberspace, where many nations are asserting greater control online,
challenging the notion of cyberspace as a commons.77
Commons exist at both the domestic and international levels.
Domestically, the “commons” may be defined as areas in which
“common pool resources” are found.78 Such common pool resources
are exhaustible, and are managed through a property regime in
which enforcing the exclusion of a defined user pool is difficult.79
Examples include some fisheries, pastures, and forests. What do
fisheries have to do with cybersecurity? It is the difficulties of
enforcement and overuse that binds these areas together. The
possibility of overuse, however, differs across domains. Information
itself cannot be overused in the same way that a fishery can be
overfished, so long as the information is non-rivalrous, meaning that

FRAMEWORK?, 1–3 (2010), available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/
SF-259.pdf (merging the traditional civilian definition of global commons, which
includes Antarctica, and emphasizing the importance to the U.S. military of
operating throughout the global commons).
75. See KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xix–xx (1998) (describing the history of international efforts
to bring the seabed, ocean floor, and outer space resources, such as the moon,
within the CHM); infra Part II.B.
76. BASLAR, supra note 75, at 225–26; see also Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden
Right?: The Expansion of Closed Seas and its Consequences, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2, 4
(2011) (arguing that more nations are exerting pressure on the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea to control more coastal resources thereby lessening the influence
of the CHM concept).
77. See Deibert, supra note 70, at 46 (describing the trend in the past decade of
nations abandoning a laissez-faire approach to Internet governance and asserting
themselves in cyberspace); Paul Tassi, The Philippines Passes a Cybercrime Prevention Act that
Makes SOPA Look Reasonable, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012, 8:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/insertcoin/2012/10/02/the-philippines-passes-the-cybercrime-prevention-act-that
-makes-sopa-look-reasonable/.
78. See SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 2–5 (1998)
(explaining that common pool resources implicate property rights and are defined
as “subtractable resources managed under a property regime in which a legally
defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the resource domain”).
79. Id. at 5; see also JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., HARV. UNIV., CYBER POWER 15 (2010),
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf (making the
case that cyberspace may be considered a type of common pool resource, and as such
“self-organization is possible under certain conditions”).
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one person’s use does not take away available goods from others.80
Cyberspace, however, as has been stated is more than information or
computer networks.81 Overuse can occur in cyberspace, such as
through spam messages, which have been called a form of
“information pollution,”82 and distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks, which can cause targeted websites to crash through too many
requests.83
At the international level, the expansive areas that “do not fall
within the jurisdiction of any one country are termed international
commons or global commons.”84 These are regions to which all
nations enjoy legal access but in which enforcement of a nation’s laws
is difficult. Each area of the commons is unique, with its own
“geographical, economic, legal, and administrative attributes.”85 The
different domains of the global commons existing beyond national
jurisdiction are not states, since they lack the requirements of
statehood such as a permanent population.86 Instead, the commons
are governed through a mixture of regulations at multiple levels,
including multilateral treaty regimes, regional accords, and national
regulations. There is no binding legal principle uniting these
disparate regimes, but the closest candidate historically has been the
CHM concept discussed in Part II.87 Cyberspace is the most recent
and contested addition to the global commons and, as a result,
80. See NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE:
THE EFFECTS OF CYBERSPACE ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53 (2004)
(emphasizing the inherent difference between fisheries and the Internet in the
nature of the resource shared); HESS & OSTROM, supra note 71, at 9.
81. See, e.g., David T. Fahrenkrug, Cyberspace Defined, AIR UNIV.,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/wrightstuff/cyberspace_defined_wrightstuff_
17may07.htm (last visited June 15, 2013) (explaining that cyberspace is a real,
physical domain and is thus distinct from the information transmitted through it).
82. David A. Bray, Information Pollution, Knowledge Overload, Limited
Attention Spans, and Our Responsibilities as IS Professionals 1, 3 (June 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962732.
83. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The
Need for Individual Accountability on Tomorrow’s Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3,
¶¶ 2–6 & ¶10 n.35 (describing how DDoS attacks have been used in conjunction
with more conventional warfare tools, such as in the 2008 conflict between Russia
and Georgia in South Ossetia, but arguing that such country-wide tactics would be
more difficult in countries with greater interconnectivity such as the United States).
84. BUCK, supra note 78, at 5–6.
85. JOYNER, supra note 73, at 27.
86. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46
(2d ed. 2006) (referring to the traditional criteria of statehood in the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, which includes a permanent
population, defined territory, government, and the ability to enter into relations with
other states).
87. See infra notes 256–59 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
using CHM concept to govern international use of cyberspace).
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“regulation,” understood here as “all mechanisms of social control—
including unintentional and non-state processes,”88 over this area is
still evolving.
A number of scholarly works and U.S. government reports identify
cyberspace as being part of the global commons. For example, the
2005 U.S. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states,
“[t]he global commons consist of international waters and airspace,
space, and cyberspace.”89 The 2008 National Defense Strategy does
not specifically reference cyberspace, but it does include
“information transmitted under the ocean or through space” when
discussing global commons.90
Disagreement persists, however,
including between U.S. government officials and think tanks, about
the extent to which cyberspace should be considered part of the
global commons. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Deputy
Secretary Jane Holl Lute has argued that cyberspace is not a global
commons: “It’s more like light than like air or water. There are no
perfect metaphors . . . [or] historical analogies.”91 According to
James Lewis, the Director and Senior Fellow of the Technology and
Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, “Cyberspace is not a global commons. It is a shared global
infrastructure.”92 Opinions about the nature of cyberspace abound,
which underscores both the importance of and widespread interest in
the topic, as well as the necessity of paying attention to both sides of
the debate to find common ground. To that end and given the
realities of private and governmental control, the following
subsection analyzes cyberspace as a pseudocommons.93

88. ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., A READER ON REGULATION 4 (1998).
89. Franzese, supra note 38, at 14 (quoting STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE,
supra note 74, at 12).
90. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 16 (2008), available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2008nationaldefensestrategy.pdf.
91. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the
Black Hat Conference (July 29, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches
/sp_1280437519818.shtm.
92. Cybersecurity: Next Steps to Protect Our Critical Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 16 (2010) [hereinafter Cybersecurity:
Next Steps] (statement of James A. Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and
Public Policy Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
93. See NYE, supra note 79, at 15 (referring to cyberspace as an “imperfect
commons” due to its joint owners and unclear rules). This notion may be
considered analogous to the pseudocommons concept.
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C. The Cyber Pseudocommons
Cyberspace does share certain traits with other areas of the global
commons. It is in some ways an open access system, the traditional
components of which include unregulated areas featuring relatively
undefined property rights, enforcement problems, and overuse issues
(as with spam and DDoS attacks).94 The open source “creative
commons” movement, and even the TCP/IP framework, which allows
diverse networks to talk to one another, creating security and
governance implications, are testaments to the commons features of
cyberspace.95 However, much of the Internet’s infrastructure is
owned and operated by private firms and subject to the jurisdiction of
myriad laws and regulations around the world.96 Thus, cyberspace is
not an area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. At best,
cyberspace may be considered a pseudocommons comprised of a
shared global infrastructure that is controlled by public and private
entities subject to national and international regulations.97 Fully
understanding the unique status of cyberspace and its implications
for cybersecurity requires analyzing the nature and extent of public
and private sector regulation. First, if one assumes that cyberspace is
a pseudocommons, then it follows that it must be susceptible to some
derivation of the tragedy of the commons scenario.98 That scenario is
addressed in the following section in order to analyze the
applicability of classic solutions to this policy problem, namely
nationalization and privatization.

94. See David Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later, 18
HUM. ECOLOGY 1, 4 (1990) (describing the open access system of property rights as
one in which access to the resource on the property is available to everyone, free,
and unregulated). Feeny also explains that open access systems lead to degradation
of the resource due to overuse and an inability to enforce regulations or exclusion
mechanisms. Id. at 6, 9.
95. Deibert, supra note 70, at 56–57. The Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and
the Internet Protocol (IP) are the set of protocols that are responsible for the
interconnections underpinning the Internet. See, e.g., Howard Gilbert, Introduction to
TCP/IP, YALE (Feb. 2, 1995), http://www.yale.edu/pclt/COMM/TCPIP.HTM
(explaining how TCP was part of a system designed by the Department of Defense to
facilitate the connection of networks belonging to different vendors to each other to
create the Internet by ensuring that data is delivered correctly and completely).
96. See Deibert, supra note 70, at 57.
97. See Cybersecurity: Next Steps, supra note 92, at 16 (statement of James A. Lewis,
Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies) (rejecting the idea that cyberspace is a global
commons because the resources used in cyberspace are often privately owned by
entities located in different jurisdictions).
98. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 81 (explaining Lessig’s two alternative
regulatory models of the commons).

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD CYBERPEACE

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

1293

D. Tragedy of the Cyber Pseudocommons
The first step in understanding cyberspace as a commons
susceptible to a tragedy is to review collective action problems, which
are classic “social dilemma[s].”99 People frequently maximize their
short-term individual interests ahead of the collective good. This is a
“dilemma,” in economic terms, because an outcome exists that would
make everyone better off if people cooperated.100 Similar problems
in which lack of cooperation leads to suboptimal results for the
participants are the prisoner’s dilemma and free riding.101 According
to Professor Ostrom, free riders “enjoy the benefit of others’ restraint
in using shared resources or others’ contribution to collective
action.”102 But if many individuals decide to free ride in this manner,
“eventually no one contributes” resulting in “collective inaction.”103
The common benefits then are not achieved.
In managing
cyberattacks, for example, nations that work to police the Internet
and catch attackers enjoy many of the same benefits from their
actions as those that do not. This can in turn result in a “tragedy.”
The tragedy of the commons model predicts the gradual
overexploitation of all resources—including oceans and the
atmosphere—used in common.104 This model does not apply to
cyberspace in a traditional way. At the most basic level, cyberspace
itself can expand as more users access it through the addition of new
networks,105 but increased use also multiplies threat vectors as well as
the potential supply of malicious actors who are able to launch

99. See Ostrom, supra note 43, at 6 (defining “social dilemmas” as situations in
which individual decisions are both uncoordinated and aimed at maximizing
individual short-term benefits, inadvertently resulting in lower long-term outcome
for everyone involved).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 7–8.
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. (emphasis omitted).
104. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968) (predicting the depletion of common pool resources based on the short-term
rational choices of individuals made irrespective of long-term consequences).
105. See TIM JORDAN, CYBERPOWER: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF CYBERSPACE AND
THE INTERNET 120 (1999) (describing the increase in Internet access as well as
information overload); cf. RON DEIBERT, CAN. DEF. & FOREIGN AFFAIRS INST.,
DISTRIBUTED SECURITY AS CYBER STRATEGY: OUTLINING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR
CANADA IN CYBERSPACE 6–11 (2012), available at https://citizenlab.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/CDFAI-Distributed-Security-as-Cyber-Strategy_-outlining-a
-comprehensive-approach-for-Canada-in-Cyber.pdf (discussing the expansion of
cyberspace to other countries and regions of the world, yet noting the increasing use
of censorship practices within some of these nations).
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attacks against a greater array of networks.106 Former DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff, for example, has argued that the cyberthreat
constitutes “a potential tragedy of the commons scenario” given
“[o]ur reliance on cyberspace.”107
Without concerted action,
vulnerabilities may ultimately degrade the cyberspace resource on
which companies, countries, and the international community
depend.108
Vulnerabilities may take many forms, including spam and
cyberattacks. A spammer incurs minor costs but imposes large costs
on individuals and organizations, resulting in a negative externality
analogous to environmental pollution.109 Similar to the classic
tragedy of the commons involving overgrazing on a village green,
here the spammer enjoys the full benefit of each e-mail, but shares
the cost with the rest of society.110 Acting rationally then, spammers
will not refrain from spamming, which helps explain the phenomenal
growth in spam messages.111 The U.S. Congress has recognized this
potential tragedy, stating in a Senate report that “[l]eft unchecked at
its present rate of increase, spam may soon undermine the usefulness

106. See Nick Nykodym et al., Criminal Profiling and Insider Cyber Crime, 2 DIGITAL
INVESTIGATION 261, 264–65 (2005) (explaining how the Internet’s expanding role in
business has correspondingly increased the threat of cybercrime and made criminals
more difficult to catch); Richard Chirgwin, AusCERT Wrap-Up, Day 2: Attack Vectors Will
Multiply Faster than Defences, CSO (May 17, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.cso.com.au/article/
424868/auscert_wrap-up_day_2_attack_vectors_will_multiply_faster_than_defences/
(declaring that it is “hard to escape the conclusion that the ‘Internet of Things’ will create
a host of new attack vectors that will probably only become clear after we have
enthusiastically adopted a new technology”).
107. Michael Chertoff, Foreword, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2010).
108. See, e.g., Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure
Cyberspace, EUR. COMM’N 2 (Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter EU Cybersecurity Strategy]
(reporting that “a 2012 Eurobarometer survey showed that almost a third of
Europeans are not confident in their ability to use the internet for banking or
purchases” (footnote omitted)).
109. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation
Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2006) (comparing the
negative externalities created by spammers by forcing recipients to spend more time
filtering and reading e-mails to the negative externalities polluters create by forcing
others to deal with emissions).
110. See id. at 27.
111. See Lily Zhang, Note, The CAN-SPAM Act: An Insufficient Response to the Growing
Spam Problem, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 301, 304 (2005) (reporting that in 2004, an
estimated two trillion spam e-mails were sent, outnumbering traditional mail
advertising 100 to 1). But see SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT: 2011
TRENDS 29 (2011), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_
resources/b-istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en-us.pdf (reporting that the amount
of spam has decreased to “42 billion spam messages a day in global circulation in
2011” from 61.6 billion in 2010). Note, though, that these figures are merely
estimates and are in dispute.
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and efficiency of e-mail as a communications tool,”112 effectively
depleting the resource that spammers are targeting. Cyberattacks
similarly have the potential to degrade the cyber pseudocommons.
For example, cybercriminals targeting e-commerce have become so
successful that they are shaking consumer confidence in some cases,
which could result in more users sacrificing convenience for
security.113 Thus, the tragedy of the cyber pseudocommons predicts
the degradation of a resource, namely cyberspace, due to
environmental (spam) and security (cyberattacks) challenges
resulting in further enclosure and potential displacement of the
public benefit.114
A similar scenario unfolds when considering cyberspace as an
anticommons. The tragedy of the anticommons situation is one “in
which private ownership leads to underuse . . . that is detrimental to
both individual owners and the public”115—the opposite of the
tragedy of the commons discussed above.
Under this
conceptualization, each of multiple owners has the right to exclude
others “and no one has an effective privilege of use” stifling
innovation.116 This situation is rare since property owners can
oftentimes buy one another out and develop the resource, but it can
happen.117 A tragedy of the anticommons could unfold in cyberspace
due to the fractured nature of Internet governance and splintering of
property rights and responsibilities, potentially hampering both
innovation and cybersecurity.118

112. S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 6 (2003).
113. See, e.g., Alan D. Smith, Cybercriminal Impacts on Online Business and Consumer
Confidence, 28 ONLINE INFO. REV. 224, 225–26 (2004) (examining the effect that
cybercrime has on consumer confidence while noting that companies must balance
increasing security with maintaining maximum convenience for the consumer); EU
Cybersecurity Strategy, supra note 108, at 2.
114. Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 168 (2001) (explaining the tragedy of the commons in terms of
inhibiting innovation through increasing control over content).
115. Mark A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L.
& MED. 586, 603 (2010).
116. Id. at 603–04 (quoting Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998)).
117. See Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?,
REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54–56 (arguing against a biomedical anticommons,
but noting that an anticommons scenario can arise such as in situations of sequential
monopoloists).
118. Consistent with Professor Richard Epstein and Bruce Kuhlik’s conception of
the anticommons, this scenario could also arise in cyberspace if property rights
became “too strong.” Id. at 54. For example, if the movement toward state-centric
control was further crystallized.
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Part II discusses four main approaches to securing cyberspace and
warding off the tragedies of the commons or anticommons:
nationalization, privatization, common property solutions, and
polycentric regulation.119 All of these solutions have strengths and
weaknesses, and exploring them fully goes beyond the scope of this
Article. The challenge faced by governments around the world is to
reallocate incentives such that it is in the best interest of companies
and other countries not to free ride but to cooperate to secure their
networks, and clarify governance and ownership to spur innovation
and better manage the cyberthreat.
E. The Cyberthreat in Internet Governance
On February 2, 2012, FBI Director Robert Mueller told a U.S.
House Committee, “the cyberthreat will equal or surpass the threat
from counter terrorism in the foreseeable future.”120 The elements
comprising the cyberthreat are complex. No system is secure in an
absolute sense. It is possible to covertly raid and damage even the
most protected computer networks for those with the will, resources,
and patience to commit such acts—cybersecurity is a continuum in
which all users are at some degree of risk. Technical vulnerabilities,
though, are only part of the story of the cyberthreat. Other
confounding variables include the fact that the applicable
international law is often ambiguous or non-binding, while regulators
must keep pace with advancing technology that is continually
changing the threat matrix.121 Developments in cybersecurity and
data monitoring are also allowing for increased national regulation
and censorship of the Internet.122 This trend toward Internet
119. Professor Hardin favored nationalizing the commons to ward off tragic
overexploitation. See Hardin, supra note 104, at 1248. Later scholars recognized
common property schemes and polycentric regulation as potential solutions to this
scenario. See, e.g., GLENN G. STEVENSON, COMMON PROPERTY ECONOMICS: A GENERAL
THEORY AND LAND USE APPLICATIONS 1–5 (1991) (distinguishing between open access
resources and common property); Ostrom, supra note 49, at 32 (advocating that a
polycentric approach is best suited to managing the collective action problem of
climate change).
120. Alicia Budich, FBI: Cyber Threat Might Surpass Terror Threat, CBS NEWS (Feb. 2,
2012, 3:22 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57370682/fbi-cyber-threatmight-surpass-terror-threat/.
121. See, e.g., SYMANTEC, supra note 111, at 45 (reporting, among other statistics,
that there “were more than 403 million unique variants of malware” in 2011,
compared to 286 million in 2010); MacCarthy, supra note 12, at 1114 (explaining
how the concept of a bordered Internet, in which each country applies its
jurisdiction and laws to cyberspace transactions, cannot “scale up” to handle
increased international Internet commerce).
122. See Ronald J. Deibert & Nart Villeneuve, Firewalls and Power: An Overview of
Global State Censorship of the Internet, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 111, 111

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD CYBERPEACE

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

1297

sovereignty discussed in Part II is pitted against a history of a more
hands-off approach to Internet governance and complicates efforts to
address cybersecurity challenges.123 To meet the diverse elements of
the cyberthreat, some commentators have moved from a one-size-fitsall approach to a tiered model, parsing out cyberattacks based on the
attacker’s motive and means into the categories of cyberwar,
cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberterrorism.124 These categories
help define policy and legal responses to cyber-related incidents, but
problems of overlap, attribution, and other challenges curtail their
utility.125 The following subsections briefly unpack the cyberthreat
and underscore the extent to which these collective action problems
thwart attempts at management.
1.

Cyberwar
Definitions vary, but cyberwarfare generally refers to an attack by
one hostile nation against the computers or networks of another in
order to cause disruption or damage, as compared to a criminal or
terrorist attack, which involves a private actor.126 Such attacks are
known as “informationalized warfare” in China.127 From a U.S.
military perspective, cyberwar falls under “information operations,”128
which includes computer network defense and exploitation involving
(Mathias Klang & Andrew Murray eds., 2005) (describing how the technology
available to states to filter content and monitor Internet use has become quite
sophisticated).
123. See KNAKE, supra note 57, at 5 (explaining that the Internet was deliberately
designed to be run without a centralized operator).
124. See, e.g., JAMES LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, ASSESSING THE RISKS
OF CYBER TERRORISM, CYBER WAR AND OTHER CYBER THREATS 1–2 (2002), available at
http://csis.org/publication/assessing-risks-cyber-terrorism-cyber-war-and-othercyber-threats (distinguishing between cyber-warfare and cyber-terrorism).
125. See David P. Fidler, Inter Arma Silent Leges Redux? The Law of Armed Conflict and
Cyber Conflict, in CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND
POWER IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 71, 72 (Derek S. Reveron ed., 2011) (arguing that issues
of attribution, application, accountability, and assessment all contribute to the
challenge of applying the law of war to cyberspace).
126. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 6 (limiting cyberwar to actions between
nation-states, thus excluding private actors, such as terrorists, from the definition).
127. JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF
DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 135 (2011); Johnny Ryan, “iWar”: A New
Threat, Its Convenience—And Our Increasing Vulnerability, NATO REV. (2007),
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue4/english/analysis2.html.
128. INFORMATION OPERATIONS: WARFARE AND THE HARD REALITY OF SOFT POWER 16
(Leigh Armistead ed., 2004) (defining information operations as a “formal attempt
by the [U.S. Government] to develop a set of doctrinal approaches for its military
and diplomatic forces to use and operationalize the power of information”); see also
CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, COMPUTER ATTACK AND
CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 24 (2005)
(explaining the role of the Joint Information Operations Center in U.S. cyberwarfare
and cyberdefense).
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the offensive and defensive use of IT to protect critical national
infrastructure and eliminate cyberthreats to Department of Defense
(DoD) computers or networks.129 The specific doctrine of cyberwar is
a classified and evolving topic in U.S. defense circles, but the
prevailing military doctrine calls for “U.S. dominance” across all
“domains of warfare,” including cyberspace.130 This entails the U.S.
military having “freedom of access to and use of” cyberspace while
denying that freedom to adversaries.131 Both the UK Ministry of
Defense and the U.S. Joint Forces Command are working to preserve
access to cyberspace.132 Still, a genuine cyberwar has yet to take place,
even though cyberweapons are being developed worldwide without
transparent discussions about the circumstances in which they may be
used. Thus, “cyberwarfare” has become a catchall term that does not
explain cyberattacks in general. Similarly, the term “cyberattack,”
used throughout this Article, is commonly invoked by the media, but
should not be confused with an “armed attack,” which activates the
law of armed conflict.133 Indeed, a traditional war framework is
inappropriate for managing most cyber-related incidents. This makes
defining the line between cyberwar, cyberespionage, cybercrime, and
cyberterrorism all the more important.
2.

Cyberespionage
Cyberespionage,
what
some
term
“computer
network
exploitation,”134 may be understood as “operations conducted
through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or
129. See CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31787, INFORMATION OPERATIONS,
ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND CYBERWAR: CAPABILITIES AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES 4–6 (2007).
130. NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 5, at 162 (discussing statements by General
James E. Cartwright regarding the emergence of cyberspace “as a warfighting
domain”).
131. See id.; see also Larry Greenemeier, The Fog of Cyberwar: What Are the Rules of
Engagement?, SCI. AM. (June 13, 2011), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=fog-of-cyber-warfare. See generally Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B.
Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42
GEO. J. INT’L L. 971 (2011) (representing an earlier version of portions of this analysis).
132. See, e.g., Greenemeier, supra note 131 (reporting that the DoD, along with
governments in the UK, China, and Australia, are preparing to introduce
cyberwarfare doctrines).
133. See INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 91–92 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (explaining the
obstacles faced in developing an appropriate lexicon for cyberwarfare because many
terms are derived from the traditional warfare context); ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., NATO
COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST GEORGIA: LEGAL
LESSONS IDENTIFIED 3 n.2 (2008), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/
documents/Georgia%201%200.pdf (distinguishing the term cyberattack from the
term “armed attack” used in international humanitarian law).
134. NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 5, at 161.
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adversary automated information systems or networks.”135 General
Michael Hayden, former director of both the National Security
Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has stated
that the cyberattacks that government networks experience almost
daily are not cyberwar: “That’s exploitation. That’s espionage. States
do that all the time.”136 The relative ease of using cyberattacks as a
tool for espionage does, however, change the equation. Between
August 2007 and August 2009, “71 government agencies, contractors,
universities, and think tanks with connections to the U.S. military
[were reportedly] penetrated [through cyberespionage], in some
cases multiple times.”137 In 2011, the DoD admitted to losing some
24,000 files to cyberespionage.138 But the responsible spies are often
not being punished. Instead, they remain at large due in part to
problems of attribution and extradition.139 Moreover, espionage is
not illegal under international law140—though it may be illegal under
domestic law141—further complicating legal remedies.142
3.

Cybercrime
The Internet is an open system and, as such, it does not provide
significant security for users. This openness has fostered innovation
as well as cybercrime, which is among the most significant problems
comprising the cyberthreat. As some commentators have argued,
“cyber war appears to be dominating the conversation among
135. Id.; see also Irving Lachow, Cyber Terrorism: Menace or Myth?, in CYBERPOWER
NATIONAL SECURITY 437, 440 (Franklin D. Kramer et al. eds., 2009) (analyzing
the terrorist use of cyberspace).
136. Tom Gjelten, Extending the Law of War to Cyberspace, NPR (Sept. 22, 2010,
12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130023318.
137. Andy Greenberg, For Pentagon Contractors, Cyberspying Escalates, FORBES.COM
(Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/17/pentagon-northropraytheon-technology-security-cyberspying.html.
138. See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, 24,000 Pentagon Files Stolen in Major Cyberattack,
PC WORLD, https://www.pcworld.com/article/235816/24000_pentagon_files_stolen_
in_major_cyberattack.html (last visited June 15, 2013).
139. Cf. Mark Clayton, Hacker’s Extradition for Cyber Heist: Sign US Is Gaining in Cyber
Crime Fight, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2010/0811/Hacker-s-extradition-for-cyber-heist-sign-US-is-gaining-in-cyber-crimefight (reporting on the increase in successful extraditions to fight elements of the
cyber threat).
140. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 45 (1999), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf.
141. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (criminalizing the delivery of defense
information to foreign governments).
142. See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 5, at 280 (highlighting various loopholes
available to signatories within the Convention on Cybercrime’s terms that may
frustrate the prosecution of cybercrime).
AND
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policymakers even though cybercrime is a much larger and more
pervasive problem.”143 The true extent of cybercrime is unknown, but
contested estimates place losses rising from $265 million in 2008 to
over $1 trillion in 2010.144 Yet, despite its widespread prevalence,
relatively few firms report cybercrime losses to law enforcement. Part
of the reason for this apathy may come from the fact that the global
dimension of cybercrime makes prosecution difficult.145 Nations have
a common interest in catching cybercriminals, but so far efforts have
proven insufficient to stem the flood. In the United States, an array
of actors, including the FBI’s Cyber Division, the National
Infrastructure Protection Center, and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), all have a hand in managing cyberattacks.146 In fact, from
2005 to 2009, the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
(CCIPS) of the DOJ experienced a four-fold increase in investigative
matters opened by cybercrime prosecutors.147 Globally, the Council
of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, in force since July 1, 2004
and commonly called the Budapest Convention, provides an
operative but limited vehicle through which to harmonize divergent
national cybercrime laws and encourage law enforcement
collaboration.148 The Convention is stymied, however, by the fact that
it allows signatory nations to back out on broad grounds, including
“prejudice[ing] its sovereignty, security, public order or other essential
interests.”149 Together, these national and multilateral initiatives and
accords have helped to enhance cybersecurity and prosecute
cybercriminals. An effort to study the effectiveness of some of these
143. Gary McGraw & Nathaniel Fick, Separating Threat from the Hype: What
Washington Needs To Know About Cyber Security, in 2 AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE, supra
note 33, at 41, 44.
144. U.S. Cybercrime Losses Double, HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-cybercrime-losses-double;
Robert
Vamosi, The Myth of That $1 Trillion Cybercrime Figure, SECURITY WK. (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.securityweek.com/myth-1-trillion-cybercrime-figure (addressing various
studies that presented the $1 trillion figure).
145. Cf. Clayton, supra note 139; see also Shackelford & Andres, supra note 131, at
981–84 (discussing the technological difficulty in tracing cyberattacks).
146. See, e.g., Cyber Division, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbijobs.gov
/311132.asp (last visited June 15, 2013) (explaining the role of the FBI’s cyber
division in protecting the United States against cyberattacks); see also JOSEPH F.
GUSTIN, CYBER TERRORISM: A GUIDE FOR FACILITY MANAGERS 140–44 (2004) (outlining
the FBI’s recommended strategies for minimizing computer intrusions, available FBI
assistance after an intrusion, and limits on such assistance).
147. Electronic Interview with Michael DuBose, head of Cyber Investigations at
Kroll Advisory Solutions and former chief of the Computer Crime & Intellectual
Property Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (Apr. 18, 2011) (on file
with author).
148. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185.
149. Id. art. 27(4).
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regulations is discussed in Part III.150 As will be discussed, however,
insufficient overall progress has been made in stopping the
proliferation of cybercrime, calling current approaches into question.
4.

Cyberterrorism
As with cyberwarfare and cybercrime, cyberterrorism is also a
complex category of cyberattacks. The “general term, terrorist, is
used to denote revolutionaries who seek to use terror systematically to
further their views or to govern a particular area.”151 Cyberterrorists,
on the other hand, use cyberspace to “disrupt computer or
telecommunications service[s]” to illicit widespread disruptions and
loss of public confidence in the ability of government to function
effectively.152 The means used to accomplish these goals may be
similar to the cyberweapons used by states and cybercriminals, but
the ends differ. Cyberterrorists have used the Internet for a variety of
purposes, though most often for recruiting, financing, and public
relations.153 Today, virtually every terrorist group is on the web, but
true cyberterrorism remains rare.154
At least three reasons have been offered for this state of affairs.
First, cyberattacks may not illicit sufficient fear in targeted
populations. Second, this could be the result of tacit cooperation
between cyberterrorists and host nations.155 Third, these terrorist
groups may lack technological sophistication.156
According to
150. See infra Part III.
151. M. J. Warren, Terrorism and the Internet, in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER
TERRORISM, supra note 20, at 42.
152. Id. at 49; see also COMM. ON THE ROLE OF INFO. TECH. IN RESPONDING TO
TERRORISM, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM: IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 1–2 (John
L. Hennessy et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM] (defining cyber terrorism as a larger threat than an
individual hacker).
153. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. DRUGS & CRIME, THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST
PURPOSES 1 (2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of
_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf (“Technology is one of the strategic factors
driving the increasing use of the Internet by terrorist organizations and their
supporters for a wide range of purposes, including recruitment, financing,
propaganda, training, incitement to commit acts of terrorism, and the gathering and
dissemination of information for terrorist purposes.”); Charles Piller, Terrorists Taking
Up Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, (Feb. 8, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/08/news
/mn-22751.
154. See James J.F. Forest, Perception Challenges Faced by Al-Qaeda on the Battlefield of
Influence Warfare, PERSP. ON TERRORISM, Mar. 2012, at 8–9.
155. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing that cybercriminals often live in a state
of sanctuary where they have agreed to target their activity outside the host nation or
to strike government-designated targets).
156. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and National Security in Cyberspace, in AMERICA’S
CYBER FUTURE, supra note 33, at 5, 16.
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Admiral McConnell, however, “[s]ooner or later, terror groups will
achieve cyber-sophistication. It’s like nuclear proliferation, only far
easier.”157 Responding to cyberterrorism is difficult given the
problem of attribution as well as the issue of terrorist groups
operating in failed or failing states. Maintaining close collaboration
with foreign law enforcement and intelligence services, incentivizing
information sharing, and infiltrating dangerous non-state networks is
critical to better managing cyberterrorism and ensuring that it
remains a nascent threat.158
F.

Summary

Current methods of conceptualizing cybersecurity are not working.
Cybercrime and espionage are on the rise, targeting both state and
non-state actors, and the prospects of cyberwar and cyberterrorism
threaten international peace and security. Parsing out attacks by
motive and means is helpful, but neglects the extent to which both
actors and paradigms overlap—such as in the cases of state-sponsored
cyberattacks involving criminal organizations for political or
economic espionage.159 Managing the cyberthreat effectively is made
more problematic by the fragmentation of Internet governance.160
Thus, a new approach to modeling cybersecurity is needed that takes
into account current threats and trends. Considering cyberspace as a
unique pseudocommons through a polycentric lens can help shape
the way we view governance frameworks, and how cybersecurity
should be approached to promote cyberpeace. The next Part takes a
step in this direction by analyzing the evolving framework for
Internet governance and what lessons it holds for enhancing
cybersecurity.
157. Nathan Gardels, Cyberwar: Former Intelligence Chief Says China Aims at America’s
Soft Underbelly, NEW PERSP. Q., Spring 2010, at 15, 16.
158. See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 5, at 313–15; Lewis, supra note 14, at 4–5.
159. The “legal vacuum” surrounding cyberespionage can be especially
problematic for investigators. See Jeremy Kirk, GhostNet Cyber Espionage Probe Still Has
Loose Ends, PC WORLD, https://www.pcworld.com/article/166901/article.html (last
visited June 15, 2013) (detailing the fallout from the GhostNet “cyber espionage
operation” and the determination by investigators not to share data about affected
systems due to fears that some countries might abuse sensitive information).
160. See, e.g., JONAH FORCE HILL, HARV. UNIV., INTERNET FRAGMENTATION:
HIGHLIGHTING THE MAJOR TECHNICAL, GOVERNANCE AND DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES FOR
U.S. POLICY MAKERS 17–20 (2012), available at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files
/internet_fragmentation_jonah_hill.pdf (explaining the origin of the DNS system
and the fragility of its future if security and fairness issues are not resolved); Norman
Schneidewind, USA’s View on World Cyber Security Issues, in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER
TERRORISM, supra note 20, at 446, 448–49 (discussing Internet service providers’
control over a significant portion of Internet infrastructure).
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II. CONTROLLING CYBERSPACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN INTERNET SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNET
FREEDOM
On the one hand, cyberspace is a complex and dynamic universe
where no single person or entity maintains control.161 On the other
hand, as Professor Seymour Goodman puts it, “cyberspace comes to
ground somewhere.”162 The physical infrastructure of the Internet
exists in the real world connecting networks, owned by corporations,
governments, schools, private citizens, and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs). However, the flow of information that constitutes the content
of cyberspace can be thought of as a commons theoretically
accessible to any Internet user. Proponents of this view, like those
supporting the net neutrality movement, maintain that government
regulation is needed to protect cyberspace and to ensure that ISPs do
not discriminate between different types of content.163 Yet, as we will
see, national regulation of the Internet is a double-edged sword with
censorship on the rise.164 This point of contention may seem esoteric
to newcomers, but it is critical because the openness of the Internet
has both contributed to innovation and is a component of the
cyberthreat.
As the Internet has grown, battles over sovereignty have often been
sidestepped.
Recently, however, regulation of cyberspace has
garnered renewed interest with many nations asserting varying
degrees of control over their Internet infrastructures and thus
challenging the conception of cyberspace as a pseudocommons.
Against those who seek greater government regulation—so-called
“cyberpaternalists” who advocate enhanced national Internet
sovereignty online—the “cyberlibertarians” favor Internet freedom
and believe that the market should largely be left to regulate
161. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 79.
162. See Seymour E. Goodman et al., Cyberspace as a Medium for Terrorists, 74 TECH.
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 193, 196–97 (2007) (arguing that activity may in fact be
traceable to a physical location, however, doing so entails significant technological
and legal challenges).
163. For an overview of the net neutrality movement, see generally Timothy B.
Lee, The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality Without Regulation, CATO INST.
(Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-626.pdf; Jon
M. Peha et al., The State of the Debate on Network Neutrality, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 709 (2007).
164. See Deibert, supra note 70, at 46–48 (discussing differences among various
countries regarding online content and censorship). Although there are many types
of national regulation over the Internet, this Article focuses on censorship as a highly
visible means of illustrating the connection between Internet governance and
cybersecurity. Other arenas of regulatory action, such as regarding critical national
infrastructure, will be explored in subsequent research.
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cyberspace.165 Elements within the latter school also maintain that
the decentralized nature of cyberspace means that the best regulatory
system is one developed organically from the bottom-up, such as the
Internet Engineering Task Force.166
Derived from the Greek word for “governor,” cyberspace “couples
the idea of communication and control with space, a domain
previously unknown and unoccupied, where ‘territory’ can be
claimed, controlled, and exploited.”167 Unlike the physical world in
which the Internet’s physical infrastructure exists and over which
nations may exercise control, cyberspace as a virtual space is
emerging as a domain of human endeavor that is in many ways no
less significant than the real world.168 Fundamentally, however,
questions regarding who enjoys sovereignty in cyberspace, how
conceptions of sovereignty are changing, and what this all portends
for cybersecurity, remain to be answered. This Part attempts to
address these questions by building on Part I and investigating
strategies for managing cyberattacks in a new age of Internet
governance.
A. Avoiding the Tragedy of the Cyber Pseudocommons
As mentioned in Part I, avoiding the tragedy of the cyber
pseudocommons requires investigating the solutions to the tragedy of
the commons problem, beginning with nationalization. It will then
be possible to contextualize questions regarding sovereignty and
whether polycentric regulation provides a vehicle to better
conceptualize cybersecurity.
1.

National regulation in cyberspace
Analyzing national regulation in cyberspace is important for at
least three reasons: (1) national control of cyberspace is increasing
165. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 183
(2011) (suggesting that the arguments against “cyber-paternalism” made by civil
libertarians have become unfounded with the extraordinary expansion in
accessibility to the Internet); Nathan Jurgenson & P.J. Rey, Cyber-Libertarianism, P2P
FOUND., http://p2pfoundation.net/Cyber-Libertarianism (last visited June 15, 2013)
(describing the common ideology and history of cyber-libertarianism). Although
presented here as a black and white distinction, in actuality there are varying shades
of gray between these competing camps as is explored in Part III.
166. See Johnson & Post, supra note 37, at 1402 (discussing some of the legal
challenges associated with regulating cyberspace).
167. Stephen J. Lukasik, Protecting the Global Information Commons, 24 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 519, 525 (2000).
168. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 37, at 443 (discussing the extent to which
cyberspace is being enclosed).
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and is a critical aspect of its status as a pseudocommons; (2)
enclosure through national regulation is one of the classic solutions
to the tragedy of the commons; and (3) national regulations form an
important component of polycentric governance, even though states
do not enjoy a “general regulatory monopoly” in cyberspace.169
Proponents see such regulation as being consistent with a nation’s
rulemaking authority under international law,170 subject to certain
domestic protections like privacy in the U.S. context.171 At the same
time, critics question national regulators’ ability to shape the
regulatory environment.172
This subsection briefly examines current national Internet
regulations from around the world, focusing on the censorship
practices of the cyber-superpowers, the United States and China.
This examination will illustrate how such regulations are shaping the
regulatory environment of cyberspace while at the same time
beginning to ascertain the role states can and should play in a system
of polycentric governance aimed at promoting cyberpeace.173
Indeed, some governments, such as China and Russia, prefer the
term “information security” to cybersecurity and focus on censorship
as an important part of their security strategies.174 But these nations
169. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 47.
170. See, e.g., Sanjay S. Mody, Note, National Cyberspace Regulation: Unbundling the
Concept of Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2001) (arguing that critics of
Internet regulation should focus less of their attention on the legitimacy of such
regulation and more on its effects); Kelly Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the
Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSAT’L L. 57, 102 & n.235 (2010) (discussing the theoretical application of the
territorial effects doctrine of international rulemaking to the regulation of
cyberspace).
171. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living
with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 505–06
(1996) (arguing that the growth of electronic data stored on networks may have
profound impacts on personal privacy, suggesting a need to allow for broadly
anonymous Internet activity or greater protection of these data).
172. See Johnson & Post, supra note 37, at 1370 (positing that traditional
regulatory schemes derive their effectiveness from application to physical territory
while cyberspace radically undermines this system due to its lack of territoriality).
173. Given the secretive nature of cyberattacks, there is no definitive list of the
“cyber powers” or the “cyber superpowers,” but some commentators have pointed to
the United States and China as being leaders in this domain. See, e.g., BRYAN KREKEL,
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, CAPABILITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA TO CONDUCT CYBER WARFARE AND COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION 6–7
(2009), available at http://www.domain-b.com/defence/general/NorthropGrumman
_domain-b.pdf (examining China’s development of its “Integrated Network
Electronic Warfare,” a strategy that targets a potential adversary’s essential
information systems).
174. See Neal Ungerleider, The Chinese Way of Hacking, FAST CO., (July 12, 2011),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1766812/inside-the-chinese-way-of-hacking (transcribing
an interview with Adam Segal, the Ira A. Lipman Fellow at the Council on Foreign
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are by no means alone in engaging in Internet censorship. As
Professor Deibert has argued, “there is a growing norm worldwide for
national Internet filtering.”175 What impact does such widespread
filtering have on cyberspace, and are these enclosures of the
pseudocommons essential to enhancing cybersecurity, or merely a
way to prop up regimes?176
a.

The origins and purpose of cybercensorship

According to Professor Yulia Timofeeva, the term “censorship”
began in Rome “when ‘censors’ collecting citizens’ information . . .
for tax purposes, eventually came to be general moral judges.”177
Today, censorship has many forms, including inspecting, altering or
suppressing objectionable content. Yet what is objectionable is often
in the eye of the beholder. As Justice Potter Stewart wrote in
discussing the threshold between art and obscenity, “I shall not today
attempt further to define [pornography], [b]ut I know it when I see
it.”178
In the early days of cyberspace, state censorship and
surveillance were thought to be difficult due to the decentralized
design of the Internet.179 This caused cyberlibertarians to herald
cyberspace as a tool to help spread liberalization, challenge the
control of authoritarian governments, and build civil society.
However, far from being beyond state control, time has shown that
cyberspace is increasingly enclosed and regulated by public and
private sector actors seeking to filter and control content. The
technology to allow for such practices is advancing, demonstrating
the influence of technology on Internet governance and further
straining the link between Internet use and liberalization.180
Relations, in which Segal discusses how the Chinese differentiate between
information security and cybersecurity).
175. Deibert, supra note 70, at 48.
176. See id. at 46 (discussing cyberthreats and variation between countries that
promote open communication and countries that promote authoritarian
information security).
177. YULIA TIMOFEEVA, CENSORSHIP IN CYBERSPACE: NEW REGULATORY STRATEGIES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE ON THE EXAMPLE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (2006).
178. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
179. See Deibert & Villeneuve, supra note 122, at 111 (suggesting that, while many
believed the Internet to be “immune” from state censorship, recent technological
advances prove that this is no longer the case).
180. But see Alexis C. Madrigal, The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian
Hacks, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2011, 1:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebook-responded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044
(explaining the Tunisian government’s successful attack on Facebook in which it was
able to steal “an entire country’s worth of passwords” and hack political protest
pages).
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b. National approaches to cybercensorship: The false choice between
Internet sovereignty and freedom
Freedom of expression is a treasured right in the United States, but
it is culturally relative and infused with differing meanings around
the world. Cyberspace has promoted the unrestricted flow of
information, challenging many nations and their legal systems to
rethink—and in some cases reassert— censorship practices. As
Professor Lawrence Lessig has argued, “[t]he architecture of the
Internet as it is right now, is perhaps the most important model of
free speech since the founding.”181 Many nations, however, choose to
maintain law and order, protect their citizens from exploitation, and
control content to stay in power rather than promote the freedom of
speech. As a result, censorship is occurring around the world.182
Reporters Without Borders has noted that “all authoritarian regimes
are now working to censor the Web, even countries in sub-Saharan
Africa.”183 Pakistan has been intent on developing a “web wall” to
censor content nationwide.184 Many nations engaging in these
practices may be doing so in contravention of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which includes, in Article 19,
protections for freedom of speech, communication, and access to
information.185 This apparent disregard for the UDHR highlights the
difficulty of relying on non-binding international law to check
assertive national governments online. International agreement on
what constitutes illegal content, with the exception of child
pornography, is often lacking.186 The Internet is not, then, too big to
censor.
As the web becomes “more social, nothing prevents governments
or” the private sector “from building censorship engines powered by
181. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 237 (2006).
182. See TIMOFEEVA, supra note 177, at 14 (discussing the main challenges for a
state in terms of freedom of speech and the regulation of ideas on the Internet).
183. Dictatorships Get to Grips With Web 2.0, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Feb. 1,
2007), http://en.rsf.org/dictatorships-get-to-grips-with-01-02-2007,20839.html.
184. See Eric Pfanner, Pakistan Builds Web Wall Out in the Open, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/technology/pakistan-builds-web-wallout-in-the-open.html (describing Pakistan’s public request for proposals to help it
build a “URL filtering and blocking system” that would allow for systematic Internet
censorship).
185. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A art. 19, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
186. See Internet Censorship: Law & Policy Around the World, ELEC. FRONTIERS AUSTL.,
http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens3.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2002)
[hereinafter EFA] (explaining that since 1995 a number of governments around the
world have been trying to coordinate bans and restrictions on access to certain
materials such as pornography, racial hatred, and political speech).
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recommendation technology similar to that of Amazon and
Netflix.”187 China is one of the most well-known practitioners of
national censorship and the centralized regulation of cyberspace.
The following subsections focus on China’s Internet policies briefly
juxtaposed against those of the United States in order to illustrate
both these differing approaches to cyber regulation and the
interconnected, dynamic nature of cyberspace that holds important
lessons for enhancing cybersecurity.
c.

Internet sovereignty? An Internet with Chinese characteristics

There are few places on Earth where censorship is undertaken
more often and in such an array of forms as it is in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has an elaborate set of policies
and bureaucratic structures in place regulating the online experience
in China. An estimated 30,000 personnel spread across twelve
government agencies enforce more than sixty Internet regulations
and censorship systems implemented by state-owned Chinese ISPs,
businesses, and organizations.188 The bureaucracy that supports such
regulations is opaque, but Chinese Communist Party organs,
including the Politburo, high-level state offices, and numerous
ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT) shape and enforce censorship laws.189 “[A]s the
Internet’s economic, social, and political importance has grown,”190
so too has the PRC’s interest in cyberspace. But there are relatively
few official statements describing government-maintained Internet
filtering or content control. As expressed on This American Life: “The
187. EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET
FREEDOM 100 (2011).
188. See, e.g., Jinqiu Zhao, A Snapshot of Internet Regulation in Contemporary China:
Censorship, Profitability and Responsibility, in FROM EARLY TANG COURT DEBATES TO CHINA’S
PEACEFUL RISE 141, 141–42 (Friederike Assandri & Dora Martins eds., 2009) (tying
China’s rapid economic development to its increase in the use of the Internet and the
government’s subsequent regulatory efforts to censor online speech); Jonathan Watts,
China’s Secret Internet Police Target Critics with Web of Propaganda, GUARDIAN (June 13, 2005),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/jun/14/newmedia.china
(describing
China’s use of part-time “commentators” who are tasked with guiding online discussions
away from “politically sensitive topics”).
189. See Heng He, Google Exits Censorship but Chinese Regime Exports It, EPOCH TIMES
(May 10, 2010), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/opinion/google-exits-censorshipbut-chinese-regime-32461.html (chronicling the history of the Internet in China and
the government’s decision to control availability of content instead of building an
entirely separate Chinese Internet).
190. Chinese Internet Companies: An Internet with Chinese Characteristics, ECONOMIST,
(July 30, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21524821 (discussing the growth
in Chinese consumer activity on the Internet and the ways in which this increased
activity has led to distinctly Chinese innovations).
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full set of rules the censors use are known only to the government.
And the rules change constantly without notice.”191 Chinese citizens
are also encouraged to self-censor in keeping with the “Public Pledge
of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet
Industry,” which is issued by the Internet Society of China.192 Since its
introduction on March 16, 2001, hundreds of organizations,
including Yahoo!, have signed the Pledge.193 Censorship software
supporting such initiatives in many cases has been developed by
companies based in the United States, putting the United States in
the dubious position of advocating for freedom of speech online,
while U.S. companies develop the technology to undermine that
Recognizing this fact, in April 2012, the Obama
goal.194
Administration instituted economic sanctions against tech firms
whose technologies enable repressive regimes to target their own
citizens.195 Technology has also helped activists evade censors.
Outside of China, the U.S. State Department has funded training
programs to educate opposition members about best practices to
elude detection and in some instances equipped them with “Internet
in a Suitcase” technology to bypass government censorship.196 This
could help tip the scales further against censors, potentially
undermining some notions of Internet sovereignty. As Albert
Einstein famously remarked, “nothing is more destructive of respect
for the government and the law of the land than passing laws which
cannot be enforced.”197

191. Evan Osnos, Americans in China, THIS AM. LIFE (June 22, 2012),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/467/transcript (last visited
June 15, 2013).
192. Internet Society of China, Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional
Ethics for China Internet Industry, Art. 5, 20 (2011), available at http://www.isc.org.cn/
english/Specails/Self-regulation/listinfo-15321.html.
193. See Deibert & Villeneuve, supra note 122, at 115.
194. See Robert McMahon & Isabella Bennett, U.S. Internet Providers and the ‘Great
Firewall of China,’ COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/china
/us-internet-providers-great-firewall-china/p9856 (stating that two U.S. companies
are responsible for China’s increased ability to monitor the Internet).
195. See, e.g., George A. Lopez, Will Obama Move Thwart Murderous Regimes?, CNN
(Apr. 25, 2012, 9:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/25/opinion/lopez-sanctionstech/index.html (lauding the new policy’s potential to impede high-tech companies
from aiding in the commission of mass atrocities).
196. See, e.g., James Glanz & John Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors,
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html
(describing a “mesh” technology, which allows activists in countries like Syria to create an
“invisible” network, impervious to government regulation, using cellphones and
computers).
197. BITE-SIZE EINSTEIN 47 (Jerry Mayer & John P. Holms eds., 1996).
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Policies instituted by the PRC, which some have likened to an “IT
menace,”198 also have significant impact beyond the borders of China.
If current trends continue, Mandarin could well be the dominant
language on the Internet by 2017.199 The open question is whether
China’s censorship will close the nation off from the wider
innovations happening in cyberspace, and whether its policy of
Internet sovereignty is self-defeating.200 In the fifteenth century, the
Opium Wars wrought catastrophic consequences on Chinese society,
ushering in the “century of humiliation” and a deep distrust of the
West.201 Could the same thing now be happening to some degree in
the new frontier of cyberspace?202 On the other hand, encouraging
homegrown Internet firms through banning foreign competitors
such as Facebook has been a boon for domestic industry in China.203
To put Chinese Internet regulations in context, it is useful to
compare and contrast Chinese censorship with what is occurring in
the United States.
While the PRC’s censorship system is
sophisticated, it does not exist in isolation. Regulations from other
jurisdictions, including the United States, impact the Internet in
China and illustrate the polycentric system emerging in cyberspace.204
The United States is not the most wired country on Earth—that

198. Google Boss Schmidt Labels China an ‘IT Menace,’ BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2013, 1:35
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21307212.
199. See Deibert, supra note 70, at 54.
200. See Paul Mozur, China’s Self-Defeating Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/opinion/16iht-edmozur.html
(speculating
that China’s censorship will have a destabilizing impact in the long term, impeding
economic development and undermining government credibility); see also CHINA
INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, THE INTERNET IN CHINA (2010), available at
http://english.gov.cn/2010-06/08/content_1622956.htm (describing the laws and
policies regulating the Chinese Internet).
201. Michelle (Qian) Yang, Effective Censorship: Maintaining Control In China
26 (Jan. 1, 2010) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania), available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=curej
(arguing that Chinese nationalism is “still a reaction to Western infringements on
Chinese sovereignty and Western biases”); see also Thomas F. Christensen, Chinese
Realpolitik: Reading Beijing's World-View, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1996, at 37, 45–46
(characterizing the redress of the century of humiliation as a “core nationalist goal”
for Chinese citizens).
202. See China’s Internet:
A Giant Cage, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help
-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled (discussing the evolution and challenges
facing China’s censors).
203. One example is the firm RenRen, which has become China’s leading social
networking firm. See RENREN, http://www.renren-inc.com/en (last visited June 15,
2013).
204. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 47–49.
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distinction now goes to South Korea205—nor is it the freest country
online, according to according to Freedom House, which gave that
honor to Estonia.206 Yet given that the United States arguably
remains the world’s leading cyber-superpower, and is a proponent of
a “global networked commons,” according to former U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, it is critical to assess its approach to the
regulation of cyberspace.207
d.

Internet freedom? U.S. cybercensorship

There is a distinction between how the United States and other
countries, such as China, claim to view cyberspace. The United States
has a policy of promoting a single global networked commons, where
freedom of speech is sacrosanct, so long as the government retains
the ability to monitor that speech through increased wiretapping.208
China on the other hand, along with many other nations, is viewed as
building digital barriers in the name of Internet sovereignty.209 But
the debate between Internet freedom and sovereignty is an
oversimplification, and ultimately a false choice. The United States,
like China, maintains extensive national regulations that filter
content and its policy of Internet freedom has been accused of
hypocrisy, given the United States’ historic support for targeted

205. See Joel Strauch, Greetings from the Most Connected Place on Earth, PC WORLD
(Feb. 21, 2005, 1:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/119741/greetings_from_
the_most_connected_place_on_earth.html.
206. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET
AND DIGITAL MEDIA 12 (Sanja Kelly & Sarah Cook, eds., April 18, 2011), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN2011_Handout.pdf; see also
Alex Pearlman, The World’s 7 Worst Internet Censorship Offenders, GLOBAL POST (Apr. 4,
2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/rights/the
-worlds-7-worst-internet-censorship-offenders (discussing the result of an annual
report conducted by Reporters without Borders, Freedom House, and the United
Nations Democracy).
207. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet
Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/13
5519.htm (emphasizing the need for behavioral norms and respect among states to
encourage the free flow of information and protect against cyberattacks).
208. See Charlie Savage, Officials Push To Bolster Law on Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/us/19wiretap.html (reporting efforts
to fortify the 1994 Communications Assistance to Law Enforcements Act to ensure that
updates to phone and broadband networks will not impede the wiretapping efforts of
law enforcement and counterterrorism officials).
209. See, e.g., Evan Osnos, Can China Maintain “Sovereignty” Over the Internet?, NEW
YORKER (June 11, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2010/
06/what-is-internet-sovereignty-in-china.html (noting that Internet sovereignty was
originally used by U.S. academics in the 1990s to propose that the Internet itself
should be thought of as a kind of sovereign entity with its own rules and citizens).
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dictators in the Arab Spring.210 Some have even called for the United
States to declare sovereignty over its virtual borders by blocking traffic
from ISPs or even entire nations where cyberattacks originate.211
While it is true then that China goes further than many nations in
curtailing free speech on the Internet, its government is not alone in
enacting laws to control the growth and shape of cyberspace.212
Consider the case of Iran, which has been reported to be building a
national network separate from the global Internet to enhance
governmental control of information and potentially better guard
against cyberattacks.213 This process will likely not result in a
balkanization into 193 separate intranets, or private computer
networks, but the movement toward an increased role for national
regulation in cyberspace will help define the future of Internet
governance and the ways in which cybersecurity may be enhanced.
As discussed in Part III, the United States has been somewhat
successful in advancing its view of cyberspace, encapsulated in the
International Strategy for Cyberspace and echoed in the 2011 G8
summit communiqué.214 Yet, despite its advocacy for an open and
relatively free global networked commons, censorship does happen,
even in the United States.
For example, Google publishes
information about governments that have requested information
about its users or asked it to remove content.215 According to a June
2012 Global Transparency Report, between July and December 2011,
Google received 1000 such requests and complied with over half of
them.216 Dorothy Chou, a senior policy analyst at Google, wrote in a
210. See, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, The Real Challenge for Internet Freedom? US Hypocrisy.
And There’s No App for That., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2011/0217/The-realchallenge-for-Internet-freedom-US-hypocrisy.-And-there-s-no-app-for-that. (fearing that
the U.S. government’s historical support of Arab dictators and local police may prove
to be the most substantial challenge to the “Internet Freedom Agenda”).
211. See Franzese, supra note 38, at 41.
212. See Osnos, supra note 209.
213. See James Ball & Benjamin Gottlieb, Iran Preparing Internal Version of Internet,
WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-19/world/
35496978_1_huawei-iranian-activists-iranian-government.
214. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE:
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 18 (2011) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf (highlighting the inclusion
of cybersecurity and other cyberspace issues on the agendas of various multilateral
organizations and multinational partnerships).
215. Government Removal Requests, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparency
report/removals/government (last visited June 15, 2013).
216. Nicole Perlroth, Google Getting More Requests from Democracies to Censor, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (June 18, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/18
/google-getting-more-requests-from-democracies-to-censor.
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blog post that governments’ requests to remove political content have
unfortunately become a trend in recent years.217 This includes
Western democracies like the United States, from which Google
received more requests than any other country.218
A number of U.S. statutes also codify certain censorship practices.
The Children’s Online Protection Act,219 which subsidizes Internet
access for schools, requires content filtering in schools and public
libraries.220 The Supreme Court upheld the law on June 23, 2003.221
The United States also attempted to control Internet pornography
through the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which was passed
by the U.S. Congress in 1996, but struck down by the Supreme Court
on First Amendment grounds in 1997.222 From 1996 to 2002, four
U.S. states—New York, New Mexico, Michigan, and Virginia—“have
passed Internet censorship legislation restricting/banning online
distribution of material deemed ‘harmful to minors,’” but all this
legislation was subsequently deemed unconstitutional.223 Other types
of filtering designed to protect children, national security, or
enhance cybersecurity are commonplace,224 though many
controversies remain. A contemporary example is the live debate
over the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA).225
Another overarching issue is whether the Federal Communications
Commission should regulate the Internet as it does radio and

217. Dorothy Chou, More Transparency into Government Requests, GOOGLE (June 17, 2012),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/more-transparency-into-government.html.
218. See Perlroth, supra note 216.
219. Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000).
220. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5).
221. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (holding that required filtering under CIPA is not a violation of users’
constitutional right to free speech).
222. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat.
133, invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
223. EFA, supra note 186.
224. See Ronald Deibert, Internet Filtering in the United States and Canada, in ACCESS
DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 226 (Ronald
Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (explaining that Internet filtering in the United States often
occurs in specific contexts, such as public schools and libraries).
225. See, e.g., Julian Sanchez, CISPA Is Dead. Now Let’s Do a Cybersecurity Bill Right,
WIRED (Apr. 26, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/04/cispasdead-now-lets-resurrect-it; Even Worse Than SOPA: New CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Will
Censor the Web, RT (Apr. 20, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://rt.com/usa/news/cispa-billsopa-internet-175 (reporting on congressional efforts to draft legislation allowing
greater government access to online data and the harsh response such efforts have
received from open Internet advocacy groups).
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television.226 The EU Commission has similarly grappled with how to
approach net neutrality.227
How these debates play out will affect both the degree and type of
U.S. regulation in cyberspace, which in turn will have an impact
around the world because of the interconnected regulatory landscape
and environmental malleability of cyberspace. This interrelationship
can make national regulation by itself ineffective. For example, the
EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications228 has had
limited impact on the number of spam messages in Europe, as has
the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act.229 Thus, aside from national regulation, the
critical role of the private sector must also be considered as another
classic solution to the tragedy of the commons.
2.

The role of the private sector in managing cyberspace
Although nations are increasingly asserting their regulatory
authority in cyberspace, so too is the private sector, which remains in
de facto control of much of the Internet’s infrastructure, including in
the United States;230 in fact, more than 90% of the United States’
critical national infrastructure is purportedly in private hands.231
Thus, The Economist is not entirely incorrect in describing the Internet
as “a network of networks that are mostly privately owned.”232 Yet, as
Frank Montoya said, “[w]e’re an information-based society now.
226. See Amy Schatz, FCC Seeks Deal on Internet Rules, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2010, 9:36 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704256304575321273903045994.html
(describing how phone and cable companies are urging Congress to amend the
Communications Act to prevent the FCC from applying old rules designed for traditional
telecommunications networks to broadband lines).
227. Commission Communication, The Open Internet and Net Neutrality in Europe, COM
(2011) 222 final (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0222:FIN:EN:PDF.
228. Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) (EC).
229. See CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701–7713 (2006) (regulating commercial
electronic mail, specifically requiring senders’ disclosure of source and content);
Commission Communication on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or ‘Spam,’ at 3,
COM (2004) 28 final (Jan. 22, 2004) (explaining the directive is only a partial
solution to spam prevention).
230. See, e.g., Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet’s Backbone
Network, 51 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 93, 93–95 (2007) (chronicling a
“transition of control from the government to the private sector,” consistent with the
historic prominence of private telecommunications networks in the United States).
231. See, e.g., ALFRED R. BERKELEY, III ET AL., NAT’L INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY
COUNCIL, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERSHIP STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/niac/niac_critical_infrastructure_protection_assessment_final_report.pdf
(arguing that the United States will be “safer, more secure, and resilient” as a result
of increased cooperation between the public and private sectors).
232. The Threat From the Internet:
Cyberwar, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/16481504.
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Information is everything. That makes . . . company executives, the
front line—not the support mechanism, the front line—in
[determining] what comes.”233 This quotation illustrates an active
debate over whether greater private control, through clarified private
property rights for instance, should be favored over national
regulation to help improve security.234
Property, like cyberspace itself, is an important and complex
concept. In the context of cyberspace, property rights are malleable,
and applying property laws originally created to govern fox hunting
to cyberattacks can be “unnecessary, harmful, and wrong.”235 For
example, fully privatizing cyberspace through property rights risks
turning cyberspace into a medium like television, sacrificing
innovation even as it clarifies ownership.236 Yet private sector
representatives have successfully convinced judges that property
rights exist online, and so by “tiny, almost imperceptible steps,
commercial operators are enclosing cyberspace”237—potentially
leading to the creation of the anticommons discussed in Part I. As a
compromise position, some scholars call for the creation of
collaborative cybersecurity partnerships, in which limited property
rights are granted to realize appropriate returns from private security
expenditures and ward off free riders.238
The history of the Internet is full of companies that tried to
dominate different aspects of cyberspace. This follows a wellestablished trend from other industries, such as telecommunications.
After thousands of independent competitors vied for market share in
the early twentieth century, Bell (AT&T) controlled nearly all U.S.

233. Tom Gjelten, Bill Would Have Businesses Foot Cost of Cyberwar, NPR (May 8, 2012,
9:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/08/152219617/bill-would-have-businessesfoot-cost-of-cyber-war (alteration in original).
234. See Hunter, supra note 37, at 446 (speculating that private ownership of
online property will result in a “digital anticommons,” inhibiting free public access to
cyberspace).
235. Id. at 518–19 (arguing that the imposition of private property rights is a
misguided policy response to cyberattacks, because of the potential for creating an
anticommons).
236. See News Release, Stanford Univ. News Serv., Law Professor Examines
Property Rights in Cyberspace (Apr. 3, 1995), available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr
/95/950403Arc5300.html (classifying audience commodification as a consequence
of private ownership, something that is still absent online).
237. Hunter, supra note 37, at 519.
238. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the
Provision of Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 261,
276–78 (2006) (citing the exclusion of non-payers attempting to “free ride” as
essential to the formation of successful security expenditures).
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long distance lines and 79% of its telephones by 1909.239 Now the
Internet has matured and a small cohort of companies is similarly
influencing its operation and evolution. Take Facebook, which
decides what content is appropriate for its more than one billion
users through a governance regime that handles more than two
million reports per week.240 According to Jud Hoffman, Facebook’s
global policy manager, creating and managing rules for the reporting
process “is not that different from a legislative and judicial process all
rolled up into one.”241 In some ways, this top-down “technocratic,
developer-king” model is beating out the democratic bottom-up
approach,242 explored below in the context of the Internet
Engineering Task Force.243
Determining how best to manage the private sector’s role in
cyberspace is one of the hardest challenges in Internet governance.
The crux of this aspect of the cyberthreat is that in the quest to
maximize profit businesses sometimes do not take necessary security
precautions, thereby leaving them open to attacks that exploit old
vulnerabilities. This may be especially evident when the costs of
cyberattacks are not internalized. For example, LinkedIn’s “stock
price actually rose days after” a cyberattacker breached its system and
stole more than “six million of its customers’ passwords.”244 Some are
thus skeptical about the free market’s ability to enhance cybersecurity
239. See MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE:
COMPETITION,
INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE
SYSTEM 68, 73, 110 (1997).
240. See Alexis Madrigal, The Perfect Technocracy: Facebook’s Attempt To Create
Good Government for 900 Million People, ATLANTIC, (June 19, 2012, 11:01 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/governing-the-social-network/
258484 (outlining the intricacies of Facebook’s reporting system, which channels
reports through a series of processes to create refined “categories of problems”); cf.
Janet Tavokoli, Facebook’s Fake Numbers: ‘One Billion Users’ May Be Less Than 500 Million,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janettavakoli/facebooks-fake-numbers-on_b_2276515.html (critiquing the published
number of Facebook users as unrealistic given the high volume of fraudulent
accounts).
241. Madrigal, supra note 240.
242. An example of this trend occurred when Facebook took away the right for its
users to vote on changes to the firm’s policies in December 2012. See Jessica Guynn,
Facebook Polls Close: Facebook Wins Privacy Vote by a Landslide, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012,
12:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-facebook-pollsclose-facebook-wins-privacy-vote-by-a-landslide-20121210,0,2513523.story.
243. See id. (reasoning that a lack of “digital citizenship” allows Facebook to sidestep the democratic process in favor of efficiency).
244. Nicole Perlroth, Lax Security at LinkedIn Is Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/technology/linkedin-breach-exposeslight-security-even-at-data-companies.html (claiming that companies like LinkedIn
have little incentive to bolster security efforts due to an absence of legal penalties
and low risk of customer defection).

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD CYBERPEACE

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

1317

and call for increased national regulation, even as others question
regulators’ ability to keep pace with the rapidly changing cyberthreat
matrix.245 A divide persists between those favoring a regulatory
regime, requiring firms to enhance their cybersecurity, and
proponents of a voluntary scheme, featuring potentially an expanded
R&D tax credit, information sharing, and cyber-risk insurance.246 The
use of public-private partnerships (P3) to identify and implement
security best practices is an important aspect of either a free market
or a regulatory approach. Such P3s are commonly seen as part of the
solution to cyberthreat management and involve the federal
government and private sector sharing information.247 However, P3s
are not a magic bullet. Melissa Hathaway, former Acting Senior
Director for Cyberspace for the National Security and Homeland
Security Councils, argues that many P3s have been ineffective at
enhancing cybersecurity and that these programs should be
deepened and consolidated.248
Given the extent of private regulation and control, the issue of
private sector management in cyberspace is critical. Property rights
exist online and are a potential solution to the tragedy of the cyber
pseudocommons, so long as free riding and enforcement concerns
can be overcome. However, both privatization and nationalization
have drawbacks and benefits as applied to enhancing cybersecurity.
A third, often overlooked solution to the tragedy of the commons is
common property, which involves well defined group control over a
resource and leads to the balancing of costs and benefits through
245. See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Senate Debates Cybersecurity Bill, NPR (Aug. 1, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/01/157699842/senate-debates-cybersecurity-bill
(reporting the viewpoint of Paul Rosenzweig that, while “[t]here’s nothing wrong
with setting standards . . . [,] [t]here’s everything wrong with thinking that the
federal government is the right person to set the standards”).
246. See H. REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, 112TH CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE 7–8 (2011), available at
http://thornberry.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cstf_final_recommendations.pdf [hereinafter
HOUSE CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE] (recommending use of voluntary incentives to improve
cybersecurity, such as expanded tax credits and insurance programs).
247. See INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. ALLIANCE, ADDRESSING CYBER SECURITY THROUGH
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING MODELS 3, 12 (2009), available at
http://www.insaonline.org/CMDownload.aspx?ContentKey=e1f31be3-e110-41b2-aa0c966020051f5c&ContentItemKey=161e015c-670f-449a-8753-689cbc3de85e
[hereinafter
ADDRESSING CYBER SECURITY] (presenting government involvement, in addition to
private sector participation, as essential to the legitimacy and effectiveness of a
public-private partnership for cybersecurity).
248. See, e.g., Jim Garrettson, Melissa Hathaway: America Has Too Many Ineffective
Private-Public Partnerships, NEW NEW INTERNET (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.thenewnew
internet.com/2010/10/12/melissa-hathaway-america-has-too-many-ineffectiveprivate-public-partnerships (arguing that there are “too many private-public partnerships
that are not effective because the government is not focused in their efforts”).
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rules regulating joint use.249 Such a system has been applied to the
deep seabed to an extent through the CHM concept.250 This Article
next considers the applicability of the CHM concept to enhancing
cybersecurity, couched within a broader discussion of sovereignty in
cyberspace.
B. Sovereignty in the Cyber Pseudocommons
Cyberspace is not an untamed wilderness. Enclosure is increasing
with several dozen nations now routinely filtering traffic, as was
explored above.251 Similarly, Internet freedom is often honored
more in the breach than in the observance, even in the United States,
as was also discussed in the context of U.S. censorship practices.
Thus, John Perry Barlow’s maxim in his Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace, “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants
of flesh and steel . . . [,] [y]ou have no sovereignty where we
gather,”252 seems to have been debunked. Or has it? Cyberspace
retains elements of the knowledge commons from which it
originated, even as technology works to both enable and undermine
censors. The choice between Internet sovereignty and Internet
freedom, then, is a false one. There is a middle ground of
conceptualizing cyberspace as a dynamic pseudocommons in which
many public and private regulators compete and cooperate at
multiple levels. Yet if the cyber pseudocommons is to survive and
cybersecurity is to be strengthened, then multilateral collaboration
must play an important part. The justifications for regulating
cyberspace need to be considered as a prerequisite.
At least two options exist. First, the international community could
treat cyberspace as an arena over which nations can and should
exercise sovereignty through, for example, the effects doctrine.253
249. STEVENSON, supra note 119, at 3, 40. (advancing common property as a
potential solution to the problem of open access).
250. See A. L. Hollick & R. N. Cooper, Global Commons: Can They Be Managed?, in
THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMONS 141, 143–44 (Partha Dasgupta et al.
eds., 1997) (discussing the 1982 Law of the Sea treaty, which dealt with contentious
access rights issues in the deep seabed through a centralized allocation system, as an
example of the joint global commons management approach).
251. Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note
224, at 1–2; see James A. Lewis, Why Privacy and Cyber Security Clash, in 2 AMERICA’S
CYBER FUTURE, supra note 33, at 123, 138 (predicting the extension of sovereign
control by governments into cyberspace).
252. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
253. See 22 U.S.C. § 6081(9) (2006) (recognizing the international norm that a
nation can “provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory”).
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The effects doctrine permits the regulation of activities that impact a
state’s territory.254 Taken to its extreme, this notion has expanded to
include discussions of a Monroe Doctrine of cyberspace.255 Yet even
those who favor a state-centric approach to cybersecurity have noted
the important part the international community plays.
Second, the international community could treat cyberspace as a
global commons, through common property concepts like the CHM,
which is a legal regime providing for the equitable, peaceful use of
common resources.256 However, there is insufficient state practice to
support the view that cyberspace is a single networked global
commons belonging to all users, even though it is a popular
sentiment—”the Internet is the common wealth of humankind,”
according to the China Daily.257 A nuanced approach is important.
The Internet infrastructure located within a state’s territory is subject
to that state’s territorial sovereignty, as is CNI located in airspace, on
the high seas, and in outer space. Control over the content of
cyberspace is another matter, but even there some overlap may be
inevitable.258 To help manage this pseudocommons, some have
advocated for applying the common property CHM concept to
cyberspace. Thus far, however, neither scholars nor policymakers
have agreed on a common understanding of the CHM and it is
arguably losing favor in areas of the global commons in which it is
most established, such as the deep seabed and outer space.259
254. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, From Net War to Nuclear War: Analogizing Cyber
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 211–16 (2009) (offering a
more in depth, but somewhat dated, analysis of the options for regulation under the
effects doctrine and CHM concept).
255. See Reviewing the Federal Cybersecurity Mission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, & Sci. & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th
Cong. 32 (2009) (statement of Mary Ann Davidson, Chief Security Officer, Oracle
Corp.) (calling for a policy analogous to the Monroe Doctrine, because “we need a
doctrine for how we intercede in cyberspace that covers both offense and defense”
and maps to existing legal and societal principles in the off-line world). The Monroe
Doctrine announced that the Americas were closed to further European colonization
and that any such attempt by a European power would negatively impact U.S.
national security. See GADDIS SMITH, THE LAST YEARS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1945–
1993, at 3 (1995) (explaining the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine and noting that it
was a “warning against foreign intrusion”).
256. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003) (exploring the CHM
concept through the example of the human genome project).
257. Tang Lan, Reality of the Virtual World, CHINA DAILY (July 16, 2011, 7:57 AM),
www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-07/16/content_12915072.htm.
258. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining that even though traffic passes from
nation to nation within milliseconds, sovereign control applies in cyberspace).
259. See Shackelford, supra note 254, at 212–14 (arguing that many core elements
of the CHM are missing in cyberspace, including the widespread availability of cyber
weapons, growing public and private sector control, and the evolving system of
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Consequently, while the CHM concept does have some utility as an
organizing concept in Internet governance, its practical use is limited
in light of its relative decline and ambiguity.260
Concerns over sovereignty should not preclude regulation.
Nations have the right to protect their sovereign interests through
the effects doctrine. Yet, given the interconnected nature of
cyberspace, it would be prudent to enhance multilateral
collaboration and foster peaceful use. This theoretical system is
reminiscent of John Herz’s notion of “neoterritorality,” whereby
sovereign states recognize their common interests, such as the public
good of cybersecurity, while also mutually respecting one another’s
independence and the increasing importance non-state actors.261
The Obama Administrations’ inclusion of multistakeholder
governance in the Cyberspace Strategy may be a step toward this
approach.262
In summary, the choice between Internet sovereignty and freedom
is a false one. The cyber pseudocommons is neither a simple
extension of national territory, nor a global commons free from state
control. Conceptualizing such a dynamic environment requires an
equally complex system of governance. Thus, Part III analyzes the
applicability of polycentric regulation and its capacity to enhance
cybersecurity and foster cyberpeace. First, though, it is useful to
consider several case studies embodying different approaches to
Internet governance.

Internet governance); see also Antonio Segura-Serrano, Internet Regulation and the Role
of International Law, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 191, 260 (2006) (arguing that the
CHM concept applies “reasonably well to the Internet’s core resources,” but noting
that it “has not even been mentioned to date” in the context of Internet governance
negotiations).
260. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28
STAN. ENVT’L L.J. 109, 136–37 (2009)
261. See Mark W. Zacher, The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for
International Order and Governance, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 58, 100 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds.,
1992) (presenting John Herz’s theory of neoterritoriality as based not just on sovereign
states’ mutual interests, but also motivated by concerns of cooperation and respect); see
also Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Private “Partnership,”
HOOVER INST. 9, 11 (2012), http://media.hoover.org/documents/EmergingThreats_
Rosenzweig.pdf (arguing that “information about threat and vulnerability” is a public
good, but that “the remaining elements are either private goods with recognized
externalities and grave challenges for government regulation, or common pool
resources with equally grave challenges for private sector coordination”).
262. See INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 214, at 10, 12, 23–24.
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C. Fractured Internet Governance and Its Security Implications
Theorists have considered cyberspace as either an “environment
without borders and free from state control,”263 or a space where
regulation is possible.264 Although reaching opposite conclusions,
both models share a similar methodology in that they assume a
relatively static regulatory universe. More recent scholarship has
recognized the complexity inherent in regulation of cyberspace and
that a dynamic model of Internet governance is required.265 As a
prerequisite to analyzing whether polycentric governance can
enhance cybersecurity, the remainder of this Part uses the case
studies of ICANN and IETF to begin constructing such a model.
1.

Institutionalized governance: ICANN and the precarious root
Given that the TCP/IP network was not yet geopolitically or
economically vital in the 1980s and early 1990s, then-nascent Internet
governance was informal.266 That apathy ended by the mid-1990s.
Suddenly fortunes were at stake and politicians became more
concerned with who controlled the root⎯that is “the power to add or
delete top-level domains”⎯foreshadowing the larger debates about
governance and cybersecurity to follow.267 For example, whoever
controlled the root or Domain Name System (DNS) could decide
which disputed territories received country codes and whether
trademark owners should have a right to domains containing their
trademarked names.268 So began the “DNS Wars,” during which the

263. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 250; see Johnson & Post, supra note 37, at 1370–72
(noting that cyberspace, unlike physical space, does not lend itself to “territorially
defined rules”).
264. See Lessig, supra note 40, at 502 (relying on the assumption that cyberspace
can be regulated).
265. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 250 (explaining that because of the constant
changes in the regulatory environment, the first step in constructing a regulatory
framework should be the development of a dynamic model mapping the current
environment and roles of involved parties).
266. See Hans Klein, ICANN and Internet Governance:
Leveraging Technical
Coordination To Realize Global Public Policy, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 193, 198 (2002) (providing a
historical analysis of the Internet’s nascent form as a research project).
267. Id. at 198–201.
268. See Overview, ICANN: NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS http://newgtlds.icann.org
/en/announcements-and-media/video/overview-en (last visited June 15, 2013)
(answering questions about registering country code domains and resolving
registration disputes); Trademark Clearinghouse, ICANN: NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL
DOMAINS, http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/trademark-clearinghouse (last visited
June 15, 2013) (noting ICANN’s role in developing mechanisms to protect the rights of
trademark holders).
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U.S. government asserted more direct control over the Internet’s
address system.269
As the Internet grew, research positions began to blur into
management roles.270 Managers tried to institutionalize their duties
through new organizations, including: the Internet Activities Board,
which became the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in 1983; the
IETF in 1986; the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in
1988; the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) in 1989; the Internet
Society in 1992; and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in
1994.271 As the DNS Wars broke out in the late 1990s, ISOC asserted
itself as an appropriate body for determining the “highest questions
of Internet policy”—putting it at odds with the U.S. government.272
After extended negotiations involving multiple stakeholders, ICANN
was created as a non-profit corporation headquartered in California,
and with a board of directors drawn from the private and public
sectors, though lacking a significant role for foreign governments.273

269. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 89, 91 (stating that the main goal of ISOC is to
host and support standards-making bodies such as IETF); Jessica Litman, The DNS
Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
149, 158 (2000).
270. MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING
OF CYBERSPACE 89 (2002).
271. Id. at 89–90.
272. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 37 (2006) (explaining that ISOC’s independence from the U.S.
government ultimately caused a backlash from U.S. Department of Energy engineers
seeking to clarify the bounds of ISOC’s claimed authority).
273. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 106.
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Table 1: Internet Organizations and Their Functions274
Organization

Structure

Areas of
Responsibility
Manages core
Internet
functions,
including IP
addresses and
the DNS
“Organizational
home” for
various Internet
management
groups
Develops and
improves core
technologies,
standards, and
protocols

Strengths

Criticisms

ICANN

Nonprofit

Centrality to
Internet
functionality
and track
record

Historic ties
to U.S.
government

ISOC

Nonprofit

Recognized
authority and
influence

Acts
through
members

IETF

Collaborative
Forum of
Volunteers

Recognized
technical
leadership

Avoids
policy
influence

IRTF

Collaborative
Forum of
Volunteers

Identifies areas
for future
research and
development

Industry
independence

Collaborative
Committees

Focuses on
technical
development of
web standards

Expertise in
specific
standards

Competes
with other
bodies for
policy
influence
Narrow
focus on
web issues

W3C

With regards to ICANN’s legal relevance, the organization has
been active in resolving cybersquatting disputes. In twelve years, it
has adjudicated more than 10,000 cases in which domain names were
either confusingly similar to or illegitimately misused trademarks.275
274. David A. Gross et al., Cyber Security Governance: Existing Structures, International
Approaches and the Private Sector, in 2 AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE, supra note 33, at 103,
115 tbl.2.
275. See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 158–59 (2009) (observing that the U.S. government gave ICANN the task
of dealing with cybersquatters and ICANN promulgated a Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy to resolve trademark use on the Internet); see also KATHY BOWREY,
LAW AND INTERNET CULTURES 51 (2005) (discussing ICANN’s trademark dispute
resolution policy).
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ICANN deferred to national courts only in contentious cases
involving parties legitimately competing to use a name.276 The
degree to which ICANN should be able to pursue and enforce such
guidelines depends in part on who directs ICANN. This is an
important aspect of the larger debate on ICANN’s authority and
relates to perceptions of U.S. control over the Internet. Doubts
about ICANN’s legitimacy continued through the early 2000s, and
there was even speculation that the United Nations would take over
ICANN, but that plan was scrapped amidst a negative reactions by the
U.S. government.277 A similar debate occurred in 2005 at the U.N.
World Summit on the Information Society when the United States
Ultimately,
once again beat back calls to replace ICANN.278
multistakeholder governance was affirmed, as was a broad definition
of Internet governance that included cybersecurity.279 However, in
light of recent developments, there are some signs that the U.S.
government may be changing tacks. In September 2009, when the
U.S. government’s contract with ICANN was again set to expire, the
two parties released an Affirmation of Commitments (AOC).280
Under this agreement, the U.S. agreed to transfer some authority to
advisory committees comprised of foreign government officials and
private-sector representatives that would review decisions about TLD
and domain name availability, languages, and costs.281 Other avenues
to enhance legitimacy through structural reform include enhancing
accountability from the top-down (subjecting ICANN to a “higher,
established authority”), bottom-up (making ICANN “directly
accountable to users and other stakeholders[]”), and through
276. See Christopher G. Clark, Note, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a
Preventative Measure To Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1486–87
(2004) (detailing the ICANN UDRP and the lack of restrictions against filing a civil
suit in federal court); see also BOWREY, supra note 275, at 51 (stating that ICANN gives
deference to the outcome of court litigation in more contentious cases).
277. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 123.
278. See Victoria Shannon, Victory Claims Abound for Global Web Accord, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/16/technology/16iht-net.html
(reporting that over 100 nations left control under U.S. authority after negotiations
in Geneva concluded).
279. See Rep. of the Working Grp. on Internet Governance ¶ 6.2(c), p. 82, 12 Aug. 3,
2005, WSIS-II/PC-3/Doc/5-E, available at http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf
(defining “Internet governance” as including public policy issues such as safety and
security).
280. Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department of
Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/aoc/
affirmation-of-commitments-30sep09-en.htm.
281. See id. (affirming the commitment of the DOC to “multi-stakeholder, private
sector-led, bottom-up policy development model”).
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“[p]eer-to-peer” mechanisms (providing users with “a choice among
Despite these
coordinated governance arrangements[]”).282
developments, the U.S. government maintains a dominant role in
Internet governance. That is not to say that challenges to U.S.
control do not exist. Nations including Russia, China, and India are
again calling for international control of Internet governance, as this
Article explores further in Part III.283 As former director of DHS’s
National Cyber Security Center and current ICANN President Rod
Beckstrom stated, “the Internet is on a long-term arch from being
100 percent American to being 100 percent global.”284
The future of ICANN as an Internet governance forum remains
unsettled and depends at least in part on how ICANN deals with
pressure from skeptical stakeholders, especially emerging markets. If
ICANN poorly manages many contrasting viewpoints by moving
difficult issues such as privacy to the periphery for the sake of shortterm gain, the organization’s long-term authority may be
undermined.285 On the other hand, it is also possible that ICANN
could establish more institutional trust and political capital by
addressing thorny issues such as cybersecurity more explicitly. For
instance, the organization made some progress in enhancing security,
particularly for the DNS, by formalizing the ICANN Computer
Incidence Response Team in September 2010.286 Much more
remains to be done, however, especially in allaying concerns over
plans for allowing 1000 more TLDs, which could increase the
prevalence of cyberattacks.287 Yet for an organization at risk of
obsolescence since its formation, it is no small feat that ICANN has
thrived despite entrenched opposition, even at times from the U.S.

282. What To Do About ICANN: A Proposal for Structural Reform, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE PROJECT 3 (Apr. 5, 2005), available at www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/
igp-icannreform.pdf.
283. See, e.g., Leo Kelion, US Resists Control of Internet Passing to UN Agency, BBC
(Aug. 3, 2012, 9:13 P.M.), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19106420.
284. U.S. Moves to Lessen Its Oversight of Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/technology/internet/01icann.html.
285. See BOWREY, supra note 275, at 14 (noting that ICANN has so far avoided
engaging with the contentious issue of privacy, instead hoping that “cultural
differences and the reality of competing priorities will disappear. . . . This strategy
makes political sense in terms of ICANN’s own governance problems. It does not
however provide a method for actually resolving disputes . . . .”).
286. See Patrick Jones, An Update on ICANN Security Efforts, ICANN BLOG (Nov. 12,
2010), http://blog.icann.org/2010/11/an-update-on-icann-security-efforts (formalizing
best practices based on firms including Microsoft and Skype).
287. ANA Cites Major Flaws in ICANN’s Proposed Top-Level Internet Domain Program, ASS’N
OF NAT’L ADVERTISERS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/21790.
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government.288 To repurpose Churchill, this may demonstrate that
an institution like ICANN is “the worst system of internet governance,
apart from all the others.”289
ICANN is not, however, the only institutional model of Internet
governance. One of the organizations responsible for governing the
Internet’s communication system is the IETF, which, unlike ICANN,
is a true bottom-up informal institution. One of the biggest questions
in Internet governance remains the future of the Internet’s
communication system—especially if we consider the Internet to be a
domain constituted by code.290 The next subsection explores the
relevance of code to governance, and analyzes the IETF’s approach
to managing the communications system along with its application to
polycentric regulation.
2.

Bottom-up governance and the informal IETF
Unlike the Internet’s address system and the future of ICANN,
relatively few people are aware of how the Internet’s communication
system is governed. Its policy and commercial implications are less
visible and direct than those of the address system, so it has, for the
most part, avoided the controversies that have plagued ICANN. The
IETF, a large, open access forum “of network designers, operators,
vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the
Internet architecture” helps coordinate interoperability in the
Internet’s communication system.291 Whereas the U.S. government
created ICANN, engendering questions of legitimacy that continue to
plague the institution, IETF evolved organically within an
engineering network from the bottom-up.292
IETF has been
288. See Brid-Aine Parrell, UN, IMF Join Opposition to ICANN Top-Level Domain Plans,
REGISTER (Dec. 14, 2011, 3:53 P.M.), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/12/14/gtld
_concerns_un_imf/ (announcing that the U.N. and IMF joined the U.S. opposition
to ICANN).
289. Maija Palmer, ICANN Chairman Urges Patience, FIN. TIMES TECH BLOG (July 8,
2011, 7:43 P.M.), http://blogs.ft.com/fttechhub/2011/07/icann-chairman-urgespatience/#axzz1RvDysuq6.
290. See Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance, in INTERNET
GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS 48, 52 (Lee A. Bygrave & Jon Bing
eds., 2009) (asserting that one of the central tenets of Internet governance is that the
Internet is constituted by its code).
291. Glossary, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/learning/glossary (last
visited June 15, 2013).
292. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 106–07 (commenting that ICANN was created
by the United States “artificially”). However, even though the U.S. government
decided to form ICANN, there was a period of open discussion regarding what form
the new organization should take. Indeed, one criticism is that ICANN incorporates
too many democratic mechanisms in its decision-making. See Philip Corwin, The
ICANN Policy and Decision Making Process Is Seriously Flawed, INTERNET COM. ASSOC.
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engineering new and updating old protocols since 1986 by
maintaining and publishing Internet standards. These standards are
sets of documents distributed by working groups that comprise the
official protocol set of the global TCP/IP network, in other words,
they contain the code that defines the Internet’s architecture.293
What lessons does the IETF model hold for re-conceptualizing
Internet governance to enhance cybersecurity?
In order to grasp the role and importance of the IETF, it is first
essential to understand why code itself is so central to Internet
governance. Professor Lessig was among the first to say, “Code is
Law,” referring to software and hardware rather than cryptographic
code.294 Professor Lessig argues that code, or architecture, regulates
cyberspace by “set[ting] the terms” on which it is experienced.295
“The basic code [that] . . . the Internet implements” is the TCP/IP
protocols,296 which makes attribution difficult. This has benefits and
drawbacks in that it protects free speech by enhancing anonymity,297
but complicates the cyberthreat because it is difficult to locate
attackers.298 Additionally, as code changes—driven by both private
and public sector actors—so too does regulation.299 For example,
certification schemes that allow websites to confirm details about
users can be both narrow (such as confirming a user’s age) and broad

(Aug. 15, 2012, 10:03 P.M.), http://internetcommerce.org/Registration_Abuse_Time
_to-Fish_or_Cut_Bait (arguing that the extended duration of deliberation results in a
lengthy process without yielding concrete action). Thus, it is too simplistic to state
that the IETF is a bottom-up organization while ICANN utilizes top-down
management processes. Rather, given that ICANN does have some limited
enforcement authority to make decisions, regarding TLDs for instance, and that it is
a non-profit representing multiple stakeholders but with authority ultimately vested
in the U.S. Department of Commerce. It is more accurate to consider a continuum
with IETF being at one end, and ICANN lying between the center and a top-down
approach. The other extreme of the governance spectrum may be considered a
more state-centric, top-down model, which, some argue, is the ITU’s approach as is
discussed in Part III. See, e.g., Ellery Roberts Biddle & Emma Llansó, WCIT Watch Day
11: We Cannot Compromise on the Internet, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/1312wcit-watch-day-11-we-cannot-compromise-internet
(describing the frustration of a number of countries with the decision-making
approach of the ITU).
293. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 91.
294. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
295. Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace, HARV. MAG. (Jan-Feb.
2000), http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law.html.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See HOWARD F. LIPSON, CARNEGIE MELON UNIV., TRACKING AND TRACING CYBERATTACKS: TECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES, at ix (2002), available at
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/02sr009.pdf.
299. LESSIG, supra note 294, at 9.
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(enabling less privacy).300
Thus, code is a critical factor in
determining what is and is not possible in cyberspace,301 including
cybersecurity.
Governments, however, can and do influence code. As Professor
Lessig has argued, this may be beneficial in the United States when
we observe the extension of the First Amendment into cyberspace,
thus ensuring the continuation of core constitutional values in this
new domain.302 However, other nations with different traditions are
also shaping code, and those effects can spill across borders.
Consider the development of wireless networking standards. The
Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers developed the first
wireless networking standard, WLAN, and most countries have
implemented this or a similar standard.303 China, on the other hand,
disliking the anonymity and perceived anarchy of this U.S.
standard,304 designed its own wireless networking standard called
WAPI, which requires both wireless devices and access points to
authenticate themselves.305 The Chinese government has said that
the WAPI standard must be incorporated into every Wi-Fi device used
within its borders, although black-market mobiles without WAPI have
reportedly made it into China.306 As of May 2010, Dell and Apple
began to sell Mini 3i mobiles and iPhones with WAPI wireless
technology to Chinese consumers.307 This example demonstrates
how governments can mandate code and regulate through law, here
with privacy and cybersecurity implications.308 It also highlights the
complex and changing collection of stakeholders shaping Internet
governance. One stakeholder—especially one as significant as China,
300. Id. at 33–34.
301. See LESSIG, supra note 181, at 33–34.
302. Lessig, supra note 294, at 6..
303. See History of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standards, IEEE GLOBAL
HISTORY NETWORK, http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/index.php/History_of_Institute_of_
Electrical_and_Electronic_Engineers_%28IEEE%29_Standards (last visited June 15, 2013).
304. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 272, at 101.
305. See Owen Fletcher, Years on, China Pushes WAPI in Mobile Phones, CIO, (May 8, 2009),
http://www.cio.com/article/492084/Years_on_China_Pushes_WAPI_in_Mobile_Phones
(reporting on China’s limited success in pushing for its WAPI standards internationally).
306. See Sumner Lemon, China’s WAPI will not go down without a fight, NETWORK
WORLD (May 30, 2006, 9:25 A.M.), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/053006chinas-wapi-protocol.html (noting that “some phones” will support the security protocol).
307. See Owen Fletcher, Apple Tweaks Wi-Fi in IPhone To Use China Protocol, PC WORLD,
(May 3, 2010, 9:40 A.M.), http://www.pcworld.com/article/195524/article.html.
308. See Nigel Inkster, China in Cyberspace, in CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND POWER IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 191, 200 (Derek S. Reveron
ed., 2012) (detailing further the Chinese attempts to regulate and legislate code);
JODY R. WESTBY, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO CYBER SECURITY 42–43 (2004) (discussing
the security shortcomings of wireless systems).
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which is arguably creating its own “network center of gravity”—can
significantly affect the interconnected regulatory environment of
cyberspace.309 As more nations weigh in on Internet governance, as
was demonstrated with the ICANN saga, this situation will only
become more complex.
China’s insistence on attempting to
implement WAPI then, even though it was rejected as an
international standard,310 is indicative of a larger shift. As China gains
power to control network standards—the most basic building blocks
of network design—it, along with other stakeholders, can design and
implement different systems replete with varying values and security
features.311 As Professor Lessig argues, “We are just beginning to see
why the architecture of the space matters—in particular, why the
ownership of that architecture matters.”312
In comparison to ICANN’s development, the IETF has evolved
naturally from technical communities to deal with particular
problems, and as a result, it enjoys relatively more legitimacy though
it, too, is not without its critics.313 In the beginning, as with Postel’s
IANA, the IETF was a means for U.S. government-funded researchers
to coordinate with one another.314 No one was obligated to attend
IETF meetings, but it seemed to be in everyone’s best interest to do
so.315 As a sign of the IETF’s growing importance, its first meeting in
January 1986 consisted of twenty-one researchers.316 As of 2011,
VeriSign and the NSA fund the chairperson.317
The basic administrative framework of IETF was settled by the early
1990s. It is comprised of working groups and area directors of seven
functional areas, including applications, routing, and security.318
309. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 272, at 101.
310. See Lemon, supra note 306 (noting that the International Organization for
Standardization rejected WAPI as an international standard in 2006).
311. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 532–33 (1999) (“As code displaces law, law might respond to
reclaim the values displaced. As law regulates code, code writers might respond to
neutralize the effect of law.”).
312. LESSIG, supra note 294, at 7.
313. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 92, 234 (contrasting the IETF’s development
stemming from a particular problem from ICANN’s failure to achieve widespread
acceptance due to a divergent approach).
314. BOWREY, supra note 275, at 56.
315. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 91 (highlighting the informality of the IETF).
316. See MUELLER, supra note 270, at 90–92 (chronicling the growth of IETF
meetings from 50 people in 1987 to over 200 by 1989 and over 650 in 1992).
317. See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Q&A: Security top concern for new IETF chair,
NETWORK WORLD (July 26, 2007, 1:49 P.M.), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007
/073007-ietf-qa.html.
318. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 91 (compiling the various working group
subject areas).
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There is also a General Area Director who functions as the IETF’s
chair.319 These structures developed organically, and the IETF has a
reputation for being a relatively flat organization, capable of adopting
ideas when justified by results “with[out] reference to rank or formal
experience.”320 Indeed, an early IETF mantra coined in 1992
survives: “We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in:
rough consensus and running code.”321 Anyone who wants to can
join the IETF at any time for free, and everyone who is a “member” is
a volunteer who is welcome to join in the discussion and submit a
proposal for a new standard or an alteration to an existing standard
in the form of a request for comment (RFC).322
Much of the time, IETF standards are built into our systems
without our knowledge and are chosen for the simple reason that
they work well.323 As such, IETF is in charge only to the extent that
people act like it is a model of consensus governance, although one
with its share of corporate and governmental influence.324 The
notion of bottom-up governance created in IETF is an example of
one facet of polycentric regulation. This theory, pioneered by Nobel
Laureate Elinor Ostrom and others at The Vincent and Elinor
Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
University, asserts that local participation is key to efficiently and
sustainably managing common pool resources.325 Proponents assert
that self-regulation is flexible, has a greater capacity to adapt to
technological advancements than centralized hierarchies, and can be
more efficient than the exclusive exercise of governmental

319. See
Overview
of
the
IETF,
INTERNET
ENG’G
TASK
FORCE,
http://www.ietf.org/old/2009/overview.html (last visited June 15, 2013).
320. BOWREY, supra note 275, at 56.
321. Id.
322. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 68.
323. See The IETF Standards Process, INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE,
http://www.ietf.org/about/standards-process.html (last visited June 15, 2013)
(stating that the Internet Standards Process exists in its current state because it is
believed to be the best way to attain the goals of technical excellence, prior
implementation and testing, easily understood documentation, openness, fairness,
and timeliness).
324. See POST, supra note 275, at 138–39 (marveling that the rules for the common
global language known as the Internet are developed by a community of people
adhering to a set of rules as if they are authoritative and official, even though there is
no enforcing mechanism).
325. See Interview with Elinor Ostrom, Distinguished Professor, Ind. Univ.
Bloomington, in Bloomington, Ind. (Oct. 13, 2010) (asserting that individuals can
come together to create a common property regime which can be successful; while
arguing that privatization and central regulation are not the only solutions for
successful systems).
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authority.326
However, such a regime requires active user
engagement based on shared responsibility and accountability
throughout development and implementation,327 as well as
recognizing a role for higher-level coordination.328 As an example of
a particular community engaging in the equivalent of local
participation to maintain the Internet as a common resource, IETF
helps illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of polycentric regulation.
On the one hand, flexibility and adaptability are maximized;329 on the
other, a lack of a defined hierarchy and enforcement mechanisms
makes ensuring the uptake of best practices difficult.330 Because both
the future of Internet governance and cybersecurity hinge on many
diverse governing bodies working well together, exploring these
distinctions is critical, especially as more stakeholders become
engaged as discussed in Part III.
Aside from commercial interests,331 security concerns have also
prompted greater interest in IETF’s processes and decisions. IETF
has acknowledged that its standards may create vulnerabilities and
affect how the Internet manages novel threats.332 Indeed, many of
326. See Ostrom, supra note 49, at 1–2, 7–8 (stressing that scholars must move away
from thinking that without major external resources and top-down planning
sustainable common-pool resources cannot exist, and admonishing the belief that
there is only one ideal governance regime that can achieve sustainability).
327. See MONROE E. PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND THE
INTERNET 21–22 (2005) (emphasizing that the effectiveness of self-regulation
depends on full collaboration among all industry players).
328. See McGinnis, supra note 48, at 1, 7–8 (outlining various theories discussing
the balance between the coordinating role of central authorities and their
relationship to epistemic, economic, and political orders throughout time).
329. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 8–9 (discussing the continuum
between comprehensive international regulatory institutions and highly fragmented
arrangements, and arguing that focusing “on managing a regime complex ma”y lead
towards more effective regulation than diplomatic and political efforts invested to
craft a comprehensive regime because, “in settings of high uncertainty and” political
variability, regime complexes are more politically feasible).
330. See id. at 8 (discussing regime complexes as loosely coupled arrangements
located in between two extremes of fully integrated institutions that impose
regulation through comprehensive, hierarchical rules on the one hand, and a
collection of fragmented institutions on the other); see also Cole, supra note 58, at 412
(concluding that regime complexes ranging from fully integrated to highly
fragmented institutions are analogous to polycentric governance).
331. See ITU-T In Brief, INTERNET TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/ITUT/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 15, 2013) (conveying that international
information and communication technologies prevent high cost battles over preferred
technologies, which can be essential for developing countries trying to reduce costs
while simultaneously building their infrastructures).
332. See, e.g., Network Working Group Internet Draft, ITEF, Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension, (Nov. 26, 2009), available at
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-01.pdf (evidencing the type of
issues that ITEF must handle by establishing that there was a vulnerability in the
Secure Sockets Layer protocol where the attacker formed a TLS connection with the
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IETF’s early protocols “were designed without built-in security.”333 In
2007, IETF chair Russ Housley said his chief concern was improving
cybersecurity through new or altered Internet standards.334 But in
November 2010, Knake wrote that if IETF did not come up with more
secure standards soon, the U.S. government may need to get involved
to push the process forward.335 This comment underscores the extent
to which diverse stakeholders are regulating cyberspace, how
cybersecurity is a common concern to both the public and private
sectors, and the necessity of finding new conceptual models to hasten
enhancements.336 As Knake has argued, optimal Internet governance
should include representatives from these diverse communities,
including the private sector, consumer groups, the technical
community, and intergovernmental forums working at multiple
regulatory levels to enhance cybersecurity.337 This is, in essence, a call
But the challenge comes in
for a polycentric framework.338
conceptualizing such a complex system to maximize benefits and
minimize costs.
As with ICANN, IETF’s authority as a private regulatory body of the
Internet’s communications system has been challenged. Different
communities have various expectations, and in the case of IETF, the
organization sets standards yet lacks the formal authority to resolve
disputes regarding whether or how these standards are used
downstream. According to Professor David Post, “That is not their
target server, injected his content of choice, and spliced a new TLS connection from
a client—a problem which the ITEF community had to address).
333. See Marsan, supra note 317, at 2 (rationalizing that even if a consensus existed
regarding what a “secure” Internet consists of, it would be impractical to implement
that consensus by turning the Internet off one day, and starting up a secure Internet
the next day. Therefore, IETF will have to work incrementally and rework already
existing protocols requiring built-in security, even though such a process will be
unavoidably incomplete).
334. See id. at 1 (listing three specific goals of rolling out IPv6, DNS security, and
the SIDR (Secure Inter-Domain Routing) working group).
335. See KNAKE, supra note 57, at 27 (elaborating that the United States should
seek support from like-minded states, and ensure that the protocols align themselves
with U.S. objectives of cyberspace development).
336. See id. at vii (highlighting the multiple regional and national forums, as well
as international bodies seeking to build a consensus on the future of Internet
governance, and theorizing that there must be an infusion of bureaucratic reforms in
the United States to address cybercrime, cyberattacks, and the endangerment of
critical civilian systems).
337. See id. at 12–13, 18 (theorizing that the United States should welcome a wide
range of participants to shape policy and avoid state-centric processes of handling
technical issues, but warning that cybercrime is a problem that only states can
address).
338. Cf. id. at vii (placing emphasis on legal and technological solutions rather
than analyzing the full gambit of available tools including self-regulation, laws,
norms, markets, and code discussed in Part III).

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD CYBERPEACE

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

1333

game. But given the way the network has evolved to date, nor is it
anyone else’s.”339 The challenges that IETF is facing illustrate the
extent to which geopolitics, technological advancements, commerce,
and code are influencing Internet governance, and as a result the
ways in which the cyberthreat may be managed.
D. Regime Effectiveness in Cyberspace
An effective system of polycentric governance for cyberspace would
use a mixture of laws and norms; market-based incentives; code; selfregulation; public-private partnerships; and bilateral, regional, and
multilateral collaboration to enhance cybersecurity. Yet, even if such
a system could be put into practice, polycentric networks are
susceptible to institutional fragmentation and gridlock caused by
overlapping authority.340 Thus, before summarizing best practices, it
is useful to assess the desirability of such an approach by analyzing
the current state of affairs. Measuring the effectiveness of the current
regime is extremely difficult and is posed here merely to couch the
debate in greater context, and help illustrate the difficulties involved
with realizing the promise of polycentric governance in cyberspace.
Regime effectiveness is an increasingly useful metric in the analysis
of international relations.341 However, the array of literature on
regime effectiveness in fields such as international environmental
and human rights law has not been applied to Internet governance
partly because of the difficulty with making causal inferences under a
variety of conditions, given the lack of necessary data.342 Moreover,
measuring the effectiveness of regime complexes is a difficult
proposition, since the governance structures at work are diverse and
not easily amenable to quantifiable comparison.343 A comprehensive
analysis of the effectiveness of laws of cyberspace is thus beyond the
339. BOWREY, supra note 275, at 6.
340. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 14 (explaining that different
components within a partially fragmented regime complex may compete with each
other, resulting in a gridlock of innovation).
341. Michael Zürn, The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of
Current Research, 50 WORLD POL. 617, 649 (1998).
342. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (declaring that a quantitative approach to tracing the
effectiveness of relationships within human rights law is typically difficult, if not
impossible); Carsten Helm & Detlef Sprinz, Measuring the Effectiveness of International
Environmental Regimes, 44 J. CONFLICT RES. 630, 630 (2000).
343. See Helm & Sprinz, supra note 342, at 632 (suggesting that scholars “focus on
observable political effects of institutions rather than directly on environmental
impact” due to the difficulty of measuring the actual impacts resulting from a given
regulatory action).
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scope of this study. However, the literature on international
environmental regime effectiveness is helpful to begin laying the
ground for assessing some elements of the current regime’s
performance. Professor Oran Young has been among the most
prolific scholars in this area, positing five main approaches for
measuring effectiveness:
the problem-solving, legal, economic,
normative, and political approaches.344 A combination legal-political
approach is used here to analyze some aspects of the cyberlaw
underpinning Internet governance.
Ascertaining the effectiveness of cyberlaw is difficult particularly
because of the relative lack of binding international law below the
armed attack threshold. Diverse bodies of law and custom are
applicable in the cybersecurity arena to help fill out a “Law of
Cyberpeace.” For example, a cyberattack that is not an armed attack
could potentially activate an array of legal provisions, including: (1)
Article 35 of the ITU dealing with the suspension of communications
services,345 (2) domestic cyberlaw, (3) Articles 19 and 113 of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea,346 (4) applicable mutual legal
assistance treaties and status of forces agreements, and (5) the
potential for U.N. Security Council Resolutions.347 Yet, it is possible
to investigate the status of these and other treaties active in somewhat
analogous arenas, such as those governing the global commons, a
sampling of which are summarized in Figure 2.

344. Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental,
in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
CAUSAL
CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1, 4–6 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).
345. INT’L. TELECOMM. UNION, CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION art. 35 (2010), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub
/itu-s/oth/02/09/s02090000115201pdfe.pdf.
346. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 19, 113, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
347. Shackelford, supra note 254, at 198–99.
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Table 2: Summary of International Agreements Governing the Global
Commons348
Amendment
Requirements

Reservations
Allowed?

Marine
Pollution

Signature to
EIF (months)

London
Convention

Ratifications
for EIF

Marine
Pollution

% Developing
States

ITU Nairobi
Convention

Full Members

Antarctica

60

6

23

Threequarters

Yes

49

49

All

19

All

Yes

188

80

55

13

Two-thirds

Yes

1972

Antarctic
Treaty

89

1982

Whaling

1959

ICRW

1946

Subject

Year

Name

82

58

15

21

Two-thirds

Yes

348. Table adapted from JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE 152-81 (2000), and updated from data available at
the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations, International Whaling
Commission, the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, and the London Convention and
Protocol. E.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, U.N. TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON
OUTER SPACE AND RELATED GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, U.N. Doc.
ST/SPACE/11/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.08.I.10 (2008); International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 1340 U.N.T.S.
184, as amended by Protocol of 1978, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62; Convention on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 26,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120; Membership and Contracting Governments, INT'L
WHALING COMM'N, http://iwc.int/members (last visited July 2, 2013); Parties,
SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e
(last visited July 2, 2013) (including both consultative and non-consultative parties).;
London Convention and Protocol, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment
/SpecialProgrammesAndInitiatives/Pages/London-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx
(last visited June 15, 2013).
AND
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% Developing
States

1973 & 78

151

69

FCCC

Climate

Kyoto
Protocol

Climate

Outer Space
Treaty

Outer Space

* Marrakesh Accords.

83

60

143

169

78

20

44

Threequarters

No

168

77

11

15

20

No

173

78

50

21

Threequarters

No

100

55

*

99

Threequarters

No

1967

Ozone

No

162

Two-thirds
or 60;
Threequarters for
Seabed

1995

Montreal
Protocol

Yes

1992

Atmospheric
Ozone

Two-thirds

1987

Vienna
Convention

119

1985

Oceans

15

1982

UNCLOS III

Reservations
Allowed?

Full Members

Marine
Pollution

Amendment
Requirements

Year

MARPOL
Convention

Signature to
EIF (months)

Subject

Ratifications for
EIF

Name

[Vol. 62:1273

100

58

5

8

Simple
majority

Yes

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

TOWARD CYBERPEACE

Reservations
Allowed?

Governance
of Moon

Amendment
Requirements

Moon Treaty

Signature to
EIF (months)

Cybercrime

Ratifications for
EIF

Cybercrime
Convention

% Developing
States

Establish
registration
requirements

Full Members

Registration
Convention

3

7

All

No

90

23

5

6

Simple
majority

No

55

4

5

20

Simple
majority

No

31

55

5

31

All

Yes

1984

Definition of
liability

24

2004

Liability
Convention

92

1976

Rescue of
astronauts

1972

Rescue
Agreement

1968

Subject

Year

Name

1337

13

62

5

55

None

No

These data alludes to at least three important trends. First,
reservations appear in 44% of the surveyed accords, including the
Budapest Convention, which permits states to opt out of specific
provisions, thus potentially weakening the regime.349 Second, more
than half of the agreements are regional or sub-regional in scope,350
underscoring the move toward a regime complex. And third,
enforcement provisions are often lacking, as are information sharing

349. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 148, art. 42–43.
350. See JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE 156 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that participation of states
in various regimes is a key issue in mitigating global governance challenges).

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1338

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

[Vol. 62:1273

and verification provisions. The overall effectiveness of these regimes
has been varied.351
Focusing on cyberspace, some such as Professor Ostrom, have
argued that, in fact, cyberspace is being successfully governed relative
to other parts of the global commons.352 The growing membership of
the Budapest Convention, relative rarity of cyberterrorism, absence of
genuine cyberwar, and the TCP/IP’s successful accommodation of
rapid growth supports this view. However, the growth of cybercrime
and espionage,353 as well as the apparent proliferation of
sophisticated cyberweapons and state-sponsored attacks, calls this
success into question.354 Moreover, the amount of multilateral
regulation governing the global commons peaked from 1972 to the
late 1980s, and now seems to be decreasing; showing the difficulty of
crafting new consensual treaties in a multipolar world—even the
Budapest Convention was, after all, a Council of Europe initiative.
From a political perspective, which is concerned with the extent to
which regimes transfer authority from a national to an international
level, most of these regimes are relatively weak.355 Cyberspace is no
exception. As we have seen, nations are exerting increasing control
over Internet governance, and the outcome of ongoing multilateral
negotiations could reinforce or revise this state of affairs.
This study of regime effectiveness in cyberspace is necessarily very
limited owing to the lack of hard, verifiable data and binding law—
though it does help illustrate the extent to which existing governance
structures are inadequately managing the cyberthreat. While these
data may form part of an assessment of the impact of cyberlaw on
cybersecurity, broader conclusions about regime effectiveness require
351. Id. at 170–71 (providing that effectiveness in some of the more recently
established regimes proves difficult to ascertain beyond a level of informed
speculation).
352. See Interview by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) with Elinor Ostrom, Distinguished Professor, Indiana UniversityBloomington, (Oct. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
353. See DETICA, THE COST OF CYBERCRIME 2–3 (2011), available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/cost-of-cybercrime/full-report.pdf
(estimating that cybercrime costs the British economy approximately $43 billion
annually).
354. To take one other example of the continued difficulty of enhancing
cybersecurity, consider the case of online voting. This is becoming more popular in
parts of the world, but a pilot program in Washington, D.C. in late 2012 resulted in a
number of lapses. A team from the University of Michigan, for example, was able to
hack the website so that the University’s fight song would play after a vote was cast.
See Timothy B. Lee, The Michigan Fight Song and Four Other Reasons To Avoid Internet
Voting, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/10/the-michigan-fight-song-and-four-other-reasons-to-avoid-internet-voting.
355. See VOGLER, supra note 350, at 152–81.

SHACKELFORD.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

TOWARD CYBERPEACE

7/3/2013 2:36 PM

1339

additional research, data, and innovative methodologies. Yet it does
seem evident that, while current laws fall short of an ideal type for
fostering cyberpeace, these legal systems are preferable to a “no
regime” counterfactual. That is, given the true free-for-all that would
be possible in the absence of any regulation, current laws are
preferable to none at all. Although ambiguities and gaps persist, the
progress we have seen in enhancing cybersecurity would likely not
have been possible without these legal systems.356 That does not
mean, though, that these regimes could not be improved by
identifying and instilling best practices at multiple levels.
E. Summary
The governing schemes of both ICANN and IETF have strengths
and weaknesses.357 ICANN’s legal status benefits the address system
by providing it with a formalized governance structure and sense of
both stability and accountability. Despite this, the ability of ICANN to
legitimatize itself and implement policies remains contested.358
Alternatively, IETF’s suggestions may be less scrutinized because it
has never asserted any governing status, while its lack of formal
institutionalization and open access underpinnings has provided the
space for innovation and earned it greater legitimacy.359 IETF,
however, lacks the authority to mandate technical standards,
including cybersecurity policies. As the Internet has developed and
now requires someone or something to ensure predictability of DNS
for e-commerce and create new Internet standards to maintain
interoperability, both ICANN and IETF have emerged as loci of
governance.
No one body or organization governs cyberspace; rather, a host of
organizations with overlapping functions form a complex regime with
356. See, e.g., Europeans Charged in US Over Destructive Computer Virus, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 23, 2013, 10:07 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21174685
(reporting that Russian, Latvian, and Romanian defendants are in the process of
being extradited to the United States to stand trial for launching a virus named Gozi
that was responsible for the theft of millions of dollars).
357. Klein, supra note 266, at 193–95 (asserting that ICANN, albeit with its issues,
including its problem of legitimacy, has the potential to “radically change the nature
of the Internet”).
358. See Black, supra note 51, at 145, 147, 154 (addressing ICANN’s turbulent
history marked by drastic shifts in membership, structures, and procedures as it has
attempted to model itself after legitimate organizations and forge different
accountability relationships).
359. See POST, supra note 275, at 138–39 (noting that the IETF is “in charge only
because, and only to the extent, everyone treats it as being in charge” and that the
IETF has not enforcement powers).
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the benefits and drawbacks that entails to Internet governance and
cybersecurity. On the benefits side, elements of this regime complex
can act as checks and balances on one another, promoting regulatory
accountability as well as flexibility in this dynamic space.360
Organizations, firms, and even states become laboratories for
identifying and testing best practices. The history of management by
bottom-up consensus begun in the 1960s continues to be prevalent in
both ICANN and the IETF, though arguably more so in the latter.
However, because no one body has authority to mandate an Internet
standard or cybersecurity initiative, governance remains ad hoc and
subject to gridlock,361 resulting in the haphazard uptake of best
practices to manage cybersecurity challenges.
Meanwhile, the
primary intergovernmental body poised to take on the role of a
global Internet regulator, the ITU, may be controversial given that it
has historically been a somewhat state-centric organization,362 though
there are some signs of this beginning to change as is discussed in
Part III.
As the Internet continues to evolve, so, too, will Internet
governance. After all, even though the Internet could theoretically
survive a nuclear war, nothing can protect it from geopolitics.363 If
the technical underpinnings of the Internet have been based on an
informal consensus among engineers and scientists since its
inception, governments have come to appreciate the importance of
the Internet and are taking on a greater regulatory role.364
Cyberattacks, which affect both the Internet’s address and
communication systems, have also added to demands for governance
models that foster security. This brings to the fore old questions
surrounding ICANN and IETF: who has the authority to decide
which interests should be prioritized? In short, who governs, and
how is this changing? These questions are harder to answer today
360. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 18 (listing six criteria for effective
regime complexes: coherence, accountability, determinacy, sustainability, epistemic
quality, and fairness).
361. Id. at 16.
362. See KNAKE, supra note 57, at 8 (maintaining that the ITU’s approach is
contrary to U.S. interests because the ITU is not designed to manage the complex
issue of cybersecurity, has no mandate to address issues of international crime, and is
not set up to allow nongovernmental organizations or the private sector into the
discussion of cybersecurity).
363. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 63 (noting that the idea that ARPANET was
created as a military communications network designed to withstand a nuclear strike
is an urban myth, and that that goal in fact came from a Rand study on secure voice
communications).
364. POST, supra note 275, at 126–27.
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than they were in the mid-1980s or even late 1990s when IETF and
ICANN emerged. Today, the Internet is truly global, with every
continent except Australia and Antarctica having more than 100
million users.365 Determining how governance affects security and
vice versa should be a matter of common interest for all stakeholders,
whereas increasing national regulation and the evolving cyberthreat
suggests the need for dynamic conceptual models that promote
coordinated responses.
III. CYBERPEACE? MANAGING CYBERATTACKS THROUGH POLYCENTRIC
ACTION
Two meetings, one in May 2011 and the other in December 2012,
demonstrate two divergent views on the future of Internet
governance. First, in May 2011 the G8 group of developed countries
met to discuss—among much else—Internet governance, ultimately
agreeing on a number of key principles including “freedom, respect
for privacy and intellectual property, multistakeholder governance,
cyber-security, and protection from crime, that underpin a strong
and flourishing Internet.”366 In contrast, jump ahead to December
2012
when
the
World
Conference
on
International
Telecommunications (WCIT) was held by the ITU. During the
WCIT, the 193 U.N. member countries reviewed the International
Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), which were last negotiated
in 1988 and “facilitate international interconnection and [the]
interoperability of information and communication services.”367
Concerns abounded regarding WCIT more so than is typical of many
ITU proceedings. Vinton Cerf told the U.S. Congress that new ITRs
could undermine the Internet’s openness and lead to “top-down
control dictated by governments.”368 Members of Congress expressed
365. See World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS (June
30, 2012), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (reporting that the world’s
average growth rate of Internet use went up over 500% since 2000, with the most
rapid growth occurring in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America).
366. Deauville G8 Declaration, Renewed Commitment for Freedom and
Democracy, May 27, 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/deauville-g8-declaration_en.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 G8 Declaration].
367. See INT’L TELCOMM. UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2012) [hereinafter ITU RESOLUTIONS],
available at http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Documents/final-acts-wcit-12.pdf.
368. See Declan McCullagh, U.N. Takeover of the Internet Must Be Stopped, U.S. Warns,
CNET NEWS (May 31, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-5744462983/u.n-takeover-of-the-internet-must-be-stopped-u.s-warns (quoting Cerf, who
opined that the open Internet has never been at a higher risk of losing free
expression and security).
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similar sentiments.369
These concerns seemed to have been
legitimated in June 2012 when preparatory documents were leaked
“show[ing] that many ITU member states want to use international
agreements to regulate the Internet by crowding out bottom-up
institutions, imposing charges for international communication, and
controlling the content that consumers can access online.”370 Critics
worried that such proposals would give the U.N. too much power
over the Internet, though Internet governance falls outside of the
ITU’s mandate.371 The U.S. government has opposed a larger
Internet governance role for foreign nations or the ITU372 yet
authoritarian regimes lobbied U.N. member states to vote their
way.373 Eighty-nine countries ultimately signed the WCIT final
resolution that on the one hand embraces multistakeholder
governance, but on the other hand determines that “all governments
should have an equal role and responsibility for international
Internet governance and for ensuring the stability, security and
continuity of the existing Internet.”374 This language only appears in
a non-binding resolution entitled “Fostering an Enabling
Environment for the Internet,” but it has been seized on by some as
heralding a growing state-centric view of cyberspace held by many
nations, especially in Asia (with the notable exceptions of India,
Japan, and Australia) and Africa.375 The concern is that this could
lead to more regulations on content—what we generally think of as
censorship—among other restrictions, though at least some of the
opposition stemmed from a change in voting practices from
consensus to a one-nation, one-vote basis.376
These meetings seem to demonstrate two very different visions of
Internet governance—one a top-down approach with national
governments at the center, the other bottom-up governance favoring
369. See id. (quoting Rep. Fred Upton and Rep. Anna Eshoo, who both expressed
their disapproval over the prospect of greater ITU involvement in Internet
governance).
370. L. Gordon Crovitz, The U.N.’s Internet Power Grab, WALL STREET J. (June 17,
2012, 7:07 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023038222045774705
32859210296.html.
371. Id.
372. Kelion, supra note 283.
373. See id. (voicing the ITU’s opposition to voting and affirming that any changes
to the ITRs must have unanimous support).
374. ITU RESOLUTIONS, supra 368, at 20.
375. See WTIT-12 Final Acts Signatories, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.itu.int/osg/wcit-12/highlights/signatories.html [hereinafter ITU Signatories].
376. Milton Mueller, ITU Phobia: Why WCIT Was Derailed, INTERNET GOVERNANCE
PROJ. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobiawhy-wcit-was-derailed.
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multiple stakeholders. But, as was discussed in Part II, this debate
between Internet freedom and sovereignty is an oversimplification
and ultimately a false choice. Instead of a black and white
comparison, it may be more helpful to investigate the myriad shades
of gray that comprise the complexion of global Internet regulations
to find common ground. After all, even the G8 countries espousing
Internet freedom and a decentralized approach to Internet
governance still envision a role for national governments.377 While
the WCIT declaration expresses the importance of multistakeholder
governance and was negotiated at a meeting with hundreds of private
firms present.378 Yet even if we are not heading for an age of outright
Internet balkanization, we may be in for a period of greater state
involvement in Internet governance. The open questions are what
costs will this impose in terms of innovation and interconnectedness,
and how can we manage the growing reach of the leviathan to
minimize distortions and enhance cybersecurity while protecting civil
liberties?
The ICANN and IETF governance models encapsulated above are
not perfect analogues for these options, but these case studies do
provide insights that can be applied to sussing out what the future of
Internet governance might hold. Beginning with a few researchers’
ideas, today thousands of entities including private firms,
organizations, and governments have a stake in regulating the cyber
regime complex.379 On the one hand, this fracturing makes solving
continued questions over Internet governance such as cybersecurity
difficult. On the other, it is an opportunity for innovation if political
deadlock and turf battles can be overcome, and if a new era of
Internet sovereignty can be mitigated. As arguably both the most
important and difficult issue in Internet governance, promoting
cybersecurity is a crucial test for polycentric governance that will in
part determine whether either a modified system or new regimes are
required to secure cyberspace. This part begins by exploring the
implications of the IETF, ICANN, and ITU Internet governance
377. 2011 G8 Declaration, supra note 366 (stating that “[g]overnments have a role
to play . . . in helping to develop norms of behaviour and common approaches in the
use of cyberspace”).
378. ITU RESOLUTIONS, supra 368; see WTPF 2013, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION,
http://www.itu.int/en/wtpf-13/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited June 15 2012)
(noting that additional conferences, such as the Fifth World Telecommunication/ICT
Policy Form (WTPF), are also set to deal more directly with issues surrounding
multistakeholder Internet governance).
379. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 56, at 277 (proffering that the evolution of
partially overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes is inescapable).
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regimes on cybersecurity, before moving on to determine the
potential for applying polycentric principles to this policy challenge.
Finally, the implications for policymakers and the prospect for
cyberpeace are discussed.
A. Networked, Flat, and Crowded: The Future of Internet Governance and
Its Cybersecurity Implications
As cyberspace becomes more state-centric, benefits lie in sovereign
governments clarifying governance and mandating security features,
but this risks sacrificing innovation and further complicating the
regulatory environment of cyberspace. Consider the groundbreaking
Yahoo! case in 2001.380 A group in France sued Yahoo! because its
auction site was selling Nazi gear and paraphernalia in violation of
French law.381 Yahoo! based its defense on the fact that it would be
impossible to control all requests to access its many sites and
servers.382 The company maintained a French-language site, yahoo.fr,
which complied with French law, but yahoo.com, the company’s U.S.
server, was also accessible to users in France.383 If Yahoo! was forced
to remove the Nazi items from yahoo.com, users everywhere would
not be able to purchase the items, essentially “making French law the
effective rule for the world.”384 However, the French court rejected
Yahoo!’s impossibility argument, an action which seems to
undermine assumptions about a borderless Internet and
demonstrated the extent to which actions taken by regulators can
have ramifications across the cyber regime complex.385 Instead of
paying a fine, Yahoo! removed the Nazi items from its website.386 It
then sued the French organization in a U.S. court, arguing that
Yahoo!’s First Amendment rights to free speech had been violated.387
380. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d en banc,
433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
381. See Elissa A. Okoniewski, Note, Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA: The French Challenge to
Free Expression on the Internet, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 295, 296–97 (2002) (recounting
how Yahoo!’s sale of Nazi memorabilia in France contravened French Penal Code R.
645-1, and acted as the basis of the private suit in the Yahoo! case).
382. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 272, at 5.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See id. at 6 (discussing the “race to the bottom” that may result from such a
“tyranny of unreasonable governments”).
386. Id. at 8.
387. See Yahoo! Inc. vs. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (describing Yahoo!’s claim that its First Amendment
rights prevented the French interim order from being enforced); Juan Carlos Perez,
Yahoo Loses Appeal in Nazi Memorabilia Case, PC WORLD, (Jan. 12, 2006, 3:00 P.M.),
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The company lost on the French organization’s appeal in 2006.388
With less confidence and capital, by 2005 Yahoo! also bowed to
Chinese national laws by censoring search results and monitoring
chat rooms.389
Yahoo!’s transformation reflects that of the broader Internet “from
a technology that resists territorial law to one that facilitates its
enforcement.”390 Other more recent cases reinforce this trend. Take
the aftermath of the WikiLeaks episode, in which a combination of
political pressure and cyberattacks purportedly incentivized Amazon
to stop hosting the WikiLeaks website, forcing it to relocate its
European servers.391 Or consider the 2012 arrest of a Google
executive in Brazil for refusing to remove videos from YouTube.392 As
these episodes demonstrate, Internet governance is rapidly
transforming to cater more to the interest of states, and many
countries have developed laws that are shaping the global regulatory
environment.393 How can the cyber regime complex be better
coordinated to enhance cybersecurity? Should the United States take
a more assertive role in enhancing cybersecurity, or, alternatively,
should it share authority with the ITU or another intergovernmental
body?394 The United States enjoys a central role in Internet

http://www.pcworld.com/article/124367/yahoo_loses_appeal_in_nazi_memorabilia_case.ht
ml (“Yahoo later sued UEJF and LICRA in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California in San Jose to have the French court’s verdict declared unenforceable in the
United States, arguing that it violates the right to free speech.”).
388. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1220–21 (rejecting Yahoo!’s first amendment argument).
389. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 272, at 10.
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., Cyber Attacks Force WikiLeaks To Move Web Address, FRANCE 24 (Mar. 12,
2010), http://www.france24.com/en/20101203-wikileaks-website-address-server-cyberattacks-switzerland-france-usa (reporting that Wikileaks had published “hundreds of
confidential diplomatic cables that have given unvarnished and sometimes
embarrassing insights into the foreign policy of the United States and its allies”).
392. See Internet Freedom:
Free To Choose, ECONOMIST, (Oct. 6, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21564198 (“Brazilian authorities briefly detained
Google’s country boss on September 26th for refusing to remove videos from its
YouTube subsidiary that appeared to breach electoral laws.”).
393. Id. (reporting on national approaches to Internet regulation, and
highlighting the fact that “[s]ites in countries with fierce or costly libel laws often
censor content the moment they receive a complaint, regardless of its merit”). In
response, Professor Tim Wu has suggested that user committees may be created by
video-hosting services to help ensure that sensitive content is in line with local norms.
Id. If this were to happen, it could help ratchet back one component of encroaching
state control of the Internet and reinforce self-governance practices that are critical
to successful polycentric governance.
394. Cf. KNAKE, supra note 57, at 8 (contending that the ITU’s state-centric model
of Internet governance is not suited for the United States because it does not do
enough to include the private sector and non-state actors in negotiations).
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governance,395 but as the cyber regime complex evolves its primacy
will continue to be challenged, a phenomena producing profound
implications for enhancing cybersecurity. Promoting polycentric
regulation could help reframe Internet governance into a more
efficient, flexible, and representative system thereby increasing
accountability and fostering cyberpeace; but, as is explored in the
next section, determining how best to accomplish this is no easy feat.
B. Polycentric Regulation in Cyberspace: A Framework for Analyzing
Cybersecurity
Commons are not necessarily anarchic systems, but instead
complex social systems featuring their own norms, rules, and laws.396
Regulatory theorists have identified an array of modalities that may
be used to control patterns of behavior within such complex systems,
including cyberspace.
These include strategies ranging from
command and control to self-regulation, including relying on
markets to reach desired outcomes such as enhancing
cybersecurity.397
Professor Lessig identified four modalities of
regulation, including architecture, law, the market, and norms that
may be used individually or collectively by policymakers.398 Another
approach is called the public interest approach, which recognizes
that state action is needed to correct market failures and manage
public goods.399
Despite their utility though, each of these
approaches has drawbacks. The public interest approach, for
example, assumes that governments have better information than
other actors, which is not always the case in the cybersecurity context.
The question then becomes how to fashion a regime by which the
best of these diverse modalities could be used to better manage
cyberattacks.
According to Professor Oran Young, “[r]egimes are social
institutions governing the actions of those involved . . . they are
practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of
rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of
395. See Johnson & Post, supra note 37, at 1393.
396. Id.
397. See ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 34 (1999) (categorizing regulatory strategies based on
whether governments use resources to command, to deploy wealth, to harness
markets, to inform, to act directly, or to confer protected rights); MURRAY, supra note
44, at 28 (comparing how the regulatory strategies modeled by professors Baldwin
and Cave, Thatcher, and Lessig might be applied to cyberspace).
398. See LESSIG, supra note 294, at 71.
399. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 35–42.
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these roles.”400 Regimes thus have two primary and at times
contradictory effects. First, they constrain the policy options of
actors.401 Second, they create rights, such as the right to maintain a
domain name.402 Nations respond first and foremost to the concerns
of domestic politics when deciding the composition of a new
regime,403 though scientific uncertainty and advancing technology
also play important roles in shaping regulations.404 Yet even with a
high degree of scientific and political agreement, regulatory action
may still be delayed as a result of differing incentive structures among
diverse stakeholders.405 This can lead to deadlock, and even if these
diverse groups can agree on a new regime, the result may still be
suboptimal for at least three reasons. First, within the U.N. system,
consensus by agreement is often required in practice, even though
not as a matter of U.N. procedural law.406 This can lead to
codification of the lowest common denominator regulatory scheme.
Second, nations may fail to ratify the treaties. Third, even if
ratification occurs, treaty enforcement remains problematic across
many fields of international law.407 Various strategies may be
employed to address these problems, such as negotiating treaties with
incentive structures or sanctions to promote compliance, but often
such strategies are politically unpopular or insufficient. Instead,
regime complexes are formed as interim responses to overcome
global collective action problems such as cyberattacks.408
Those advocating a polycentric approach argue that instead of
creating a centralized artificial organization in the vein of ICANN,
local institutions relying to the extent possible on self-organization
should be created to promote bottom-up governance. Such a
polycentric approach would enjoy active regulatory oversight at local,
regional, and national levels. Polycentric governance then builds
from the regime complex literature that recognizes both the benefits
400. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR
NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12–13 (1989).
401. Id. at 16.
402. Id. at 15–16.
403. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 8.
404. See BUCK, supra note 78, at 7.
405. Id.
406. See Eilene Galloway, Consensus Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 7 J. SPACE L. 3, 3–4 (1979). WCIT 2012 may be
considered an example of the drawbacks of not maintaining a consensual approach.
407. See BUCK, supra note 78, at 31 (observing that across fields of international law
and international regimes “effective enforcement is virtually impossible”).
408. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 10–11 (discussing regime complexes
in the climate change context).
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and drawbacks of multilevel regulation, the importance of local selforganization, the critical governance role played by the private sector,
and the importance of hierarchy to avoid gridlock. Professor Vincent
Ostrom defined a “polycentric” order as “one where many elements
are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their
relationships with one another within a general system of rules where
each element acts with independence of other elements.”409
Proponents claim that top down planning by national officials is
often unnecessary to build efficient regimes to govern common-pool
resources.410 Echoes of this may be heard in those who think it
unlikely that bureaucrats are capable of crafting regulations that
Rather, polycentric selfeffectively enhance cybersecurity.411
organization can be a powerful tool to solve collective action
problems, but doing so requires “public entrepreneurs working
closely with citizens frequently do find new ways of putting services
together using a mixture of local talent and resources.”412 The ability
to self-organize in cyberspace thus partially depends on the technical
savvy of the user, network operator, or network owner. If done
correctly by incentivizing systems where “large, medium, and small
governmental and nongovernmental enterprises engage in diverse
cooperative as well as competitive relationships,” such a bottom-up
approach can lower transaction costs that leave people better off.413
Indeed, such communities can even act as their own law
enforcement. Despite this, self-regulation has its limits in cyberspace
given the worldwide Internet community, free riders, and
enforcement problems, among other issues.
Polycentric governance is distinct from other theories of
regulation. International law, for example, has long operated on the
premise of multilevel regulation requiring that nations and ultimately
localities implement customary international law principles as well as
409. Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity (Part 1), in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC
ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS
52, 52–74 (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 1999).
410. See Ostrom, supra note 49, at 2 (arguing that that public goods and commonpool resources may be sustained without external resources or top down planning).
411. See KNAKE, supra note 57, at 28–30 (describing the measures that U.S.
bureaucracies would be required to take in order to effectuate meaningful
cybersecurity).
412. Elinor Ostrom, Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies 2 (U.N.
Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2005/01, 2005),
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussionpapers/2005/en_GB/dp2005-01/_files/78091749378753796/default/dp2005%2001%
20Ostrom.pdf.
413. Ostrom, supra note 49, at 4.
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ratified treaties.414 But while international law increasingly recognizes
the importance of individuals and non-state actors, it arguably
remains state-centric.415 This is why political scientists such as
Professors Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed a model of
complex interdependence, which sought to supplement state action
with a greater study of non-state actors that is perhaps more
applicable to cyber regulation.416 These efforts have led to greater
study of global governance and so-called “regime clusters” in
international relations literature, which have been used to explain
uneven rates of development among other phenomenon.417 But, this
contributes relatively little to conceptualizing governance or
addressing global collective action problems. “Global governance,”
on the other hand, refers to the need for governance and rulemaking
at the global level stemming from intensifying connections between
Proponents argue that without global
states and peoples.418
governance, states will “retreat behind protective barriers” laying the
groundwork for enduring conflicts.419 While this global governance
concept plays an important role for both policymakers and scholars
in understanding the current state of international relations, its study
has been critiqued for becoming so broad that the term has come to

414. See, e.g., Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters, The Phenomenon of Multilevel Regulation:
Interactions Between Global, EU and National Regulatory Spheres, in MULTILEVEL
REGULATION AND THE EU: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN GLOBAL, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL
NORMATIVE PROCESS 9, 20 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2008) (noting how
regulations promulgated by international organizations like the WTO have a binding
effect on other legal orders like the EU, its member states, and even individuals).
415. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 231 (1993) (demonstrating
how international law has been largely built on the application of laws of sovereign
states in foreign contexts). Professor Slaughter has also pioneered network theory
studying transnational regulatory networks and its progeny. However, this work
primarily focuses on states, making it less useful for analyzing cybersecurity. See
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 (2004).
416. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 23–24 (1977) (contrasting traditionally state-centric
“realist” paradigms of world politics with a “complex interdependence” theory, which
considers how non-state actors may participate in world politics).
417. See, e.g., Miriam Abu Sharkh, Global Welfare Mixes and Wellbeing: Cluster, Factor
and Regression Analyses from 1990 to 2000, at 21–23 (Stanford Univ. Ctr. on
Democracy, Dev., & the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 94, 2009), available at
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22388/No_94_Sharkh_Global_welfare.pdf
(evaluating how various “regime clusters” correlate to disproportionate rates of
development among countries).
418. Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance, in POWER IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
419. Id.
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mean “virtually anything.”420
“Ultimately, a theory of global
governance” is more concerned with rules rather than actors and the
relations between them.421 In contrast, a polycentric approach
envisions more than simply competing systems of multilevel
regulations, or “a collective of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical regimes” that vary in extent and purpose.422 It may be
better understood as an effort to marry elements of these
interdisciplinary concepts of regime complexes and clusters,
multilevel governance, and global governance together under a
single conceptual framework so as to better study complex problems
such as cybersecurity.423
Polycentric governance is important for its capacity to embrace selfregulation and bottom-up initiatives, its focus on multistakeholder
governance including both the public and private sectors, as well as
its emphasis on targeted measures to address global collective action
problems. By “ordering and structuring our perception of the
world,” concepts such as polycentricism help us relate certain
phenomena to one another, to “make judgments about the relevance
and significance of information, to analyze specific situations, or to
create new ideas.”424 Thus, concepts are among the most important
tools of social science,425 and represent a critical starting point for
analyzing subjects as complex as cybersecurity. Having introduced
polycentrism, it is now possible to apply this conceptual framework to
certain cybersecurity challenges.
Polycentric governance is gaining popularity across the global
commons, either as an incremental step or potentially an alternative
to multilateral treaty making. What are the benefits of polycentric
regulation in cyberspace?
On the positive side, the concept
encourages regulatory innovation and competition between regimes
as well as “flexibility across issues and adaptability over time.”426 This
420. Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg, Global Governance as a Perspective on World
Politics, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185, 185 (2006).
421. Id. at 199.
422. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 56, at 277.
423. However, we must be careful not to make polycentric governance such a
broad proposition that it falls victim to the same critiques as global governance
mentioned above. To help address such concerns, it is important to focus on the key
features of polycentric governance that distinguish it from other approaches,
including self-regulation, multistakeholder governance, an emphasis on targeted
measures, and fostering collaboration across multiple regulatory levels.
424. Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 420, at 186.
425. Id. at 198.
426. Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 15; see also Constantine Michalopoulos,
WTO Accession, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 61, 61–70
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flexibility is seen in the dynamic role played by the IETF in Internet
governance. It also avoids the necessity of centralized, supranational
control, as “[b]etter, one might think, 192 sovereigns than one or a
few.”427 This networked, distributed approach exemplifies a key
insight of polycentric governance applied to cyberspace—“no one
regulator may impose their will on any subject of regulation without
the agreement of competing regulators (and the support of
regulatees).”428 For example, in the case of the PRC, content is
controlled by the government as well as external agencies such as the
International Broadcasting Bureau and the private sector.429 Loosely
linked regime complexes that avoid fragmentation are consequently
more flexible and adaptable than unitary regimes.430 This is
especially important in cyberspace where technology is rapidly
advancing, creating new environmental pressures and security
concerns. Given that the only constant is technological change,
without innovative institutional efforts at multiple scales it may be
impossible to learn which combined sets of actions are the most
effective in mitigating collective action problems like cyberattacks.
Yet not all aspects of polycentric regulation apply to cyberspace,431
and there are important drawbacks of polycentric regulation to be
addressed, such as the fact that a highly fragmented system can also
create gridlock rather than innovation due to a lack of defined
hierarchy, which leads to inconsistency and systemic failures.432 The
security lapses of the IETF are a prime example of what can happen
by relying exclusively on bottom-up measures.
Thus, a true
polycentric system requires that best practices be reinforced through
an interlocking suite of governance structures.
In summary, “[t]he advantage[s] of a polycentric approach [are]
that it encourages experimental efforts by multiple actors,”433
embraces self-regulation, focuses on multistakeholder governance
including both the public and private sectors, and emphasizes
(Bernard M. Hoekman et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the benefits of polycentric
regulation in the context of WTO accession).
427. CRAWFORD, supra note 86, at 32 (discussing the creation of states in
international law).
428. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 48.
429. Id. at 49.
430. Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 8.
431. See generally POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES, supra note 409
(describing how polycentric regulation has been applied with varying success in areas
other than cyberspace, such as public economics, police services, and metropolitan
governance).
432. Keohane & Victor, supra note 51, at 15.
433. Ostrom, supra note 49, at 39.
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targeted measures to begin to address global collective action
problems lest inaction hasten a worst-case scenario. Just as the states
are laboratories for democracy in the U.S. federal system, as Justice
Louis D. Brandeis famously observed,434 so too are firms and nations
laboratories for polycentric governance in cyberspace. This is
important since, according to Professor Ostrom, “simply
recommending a single governmental unit to solve global collective
action problems—because of global impacts—needs to be seriously
rethought and the important role of smaller-scale effects
recognized.”435 There is no supranational authority at the global level
in charge of cyberspace, nor is there likely to be in the near future.
According to Professor Nye, “large-scale formal treaties regulating
cyberspace seem unlikely.”436 Cyberspace has already become too
geopolitically important for the cyberpowers to give up sovereignty
lightly. The likely outcome is a regime complex in which a number
of national and international regulations govern cyberspace,
potentially through a club of “like-minded” nations and industry
players as envisioned in the Obama Administration’s International
Strategy for Cyberspace.437 But making polycentric governance work
is dependent upon the difficult task of getting diverse stakeholders to
work well together across sectors and borders. Polycentric regulation
has its faults, but so does waiting for a consensual cybersecurity treaty
that may come too late, if at all. More research is needed to begin to
translate these theoretical insights into policy recommendations,
which is a process begun next.

434. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
435. Ostrom, supra note 49, at 35; see, e.g., Christopher Joyce, Climate Strategists: To
Cut Emissions, Focus on Forests, NPR, (Dec. 10, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011
/12/10/143454111/climate-activists-to-cut-emissions-focus-on-forests?sc=17&f=1001
(reporting that some nations, such as Norway, are looking outside the U.N.
framework for action on climate change). But see EU Freezes Aviation Carbon Tax,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travelnews/eu-freezes-aviation-carbon-tax-20121113-2999v.html (reporting that the EU
caved in to pressure from China and other countries over its aviation carbon tax,
demonstrating the political blowback and false starts that can happen from taking
bottom-up action to address global collective action challenges).
436. Nye, supra note 156, at 5, 19.
437. See INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 214 at 9 (constructing a
strategy that heavily builds on U.S. partnerships with other nations and private industry; see
also Richard A. Clarke,Editorial, A Global Cyber-Crisis in Waiting, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-07/opinions/36973008_1_cybercrime-flyaway-teams-espionage (discussing the desirability of a like-minded approach to help build
consensus).
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C. Implications for Policymakers
Many bills have been proposed to enhance U.S. cybersecurity, but
as of this writing, Congress has failed to act on the matter. The worry
about a voluntary approach is that firms will not act to enhance
security since the costs of cyberattacks are not always internalized,
while a more regulatory approach has been criticized since federal
regulators are not seen as being flexible and quick enough to stay
ahead of the cyberthreat.438 A compromise position applying lessons
from the literature on polycentric analysis may be that it is best to
allow industry groups most familiar with best practices to fashion
local rules, followed by codification of these rules to help protect
against free riders.439 Consider the U.S. power grid regulations as an
example of an industry code of conduct adopted voluntarily and
subsequently reinforced by government.
The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission has worked closely with industry groups, such
as the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), on new
rules that promote the reliability of electrical flow and impose
tougher requirements on utilities.440 Such an approach could be
expanded to other facets of CNI, as advocated by President Obama.441
But it is impossible to consider the issue of enhancing cybersecurity
without analyzing the impact of different modalities not only in the
U.S. but around the world. Regulation is happening at multiple
levels: laws, norms, markets, code, self-regulation, and multilateral
collaboration all contribute to enhancing cybersecurity. Each of
these regulatory approaches has unique benefits and drawbacks.
Direct regulatory intervention is possible despite the arguments of
Internet freedom advocates—if not through traditional means, then
by private regulatory systems that are either contractual or built into
network architecture and promulgated by standards bodies such as
the IETF.442 These bodies may serve as “proxies for courts,” a notion
438. See Kaste, supra note 245 (illustrating the different viewpoints on the
government’s ability to effectively regulate cybersecurity through minimum security
standards).
439. This approach has also been taken by the Obama Administration’s February
2013 executive order entitled “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” in
which a framework is envisioned to establish voluntary cybersecurity performance
standards for firms operating critical infrastructure by working with industry groups.
See Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
440. Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 122 FERC ¶
61,040 (2008).
441. See Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J., July 20,
2012, at A11 (urging the Senate to pass the Cybersecurity Act of 2012).
442. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 204.
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that has become “the dominant school of cyber-regulatory theory.”443
Yet the fundamental difficulty of enforcing regulations in cyberspace
remains apparent in light of problems of attribution, environmental
plasticity, and the inter-networked nature of cyberspace.444
Consequently, norms of behavior should also be created to
supplement legal regimes, such as a duty of care to secure systems
and warn potential victims.445 The Obama Administration has also
encouraged the development of norms for respecting intellectual
property, mitigating cybercrime, valuing privacy, and working toward
global interoperability, reliable access, multistakeholder governance,
and cybersecurity due diligence.446 NATO has similarly begun efforts
aimed at constructing cybernorms by identifying best practices.447 To
be successful, such norms must be “clear, useful, and do-able,”448 and
should eventually lead to a code of conduct that meets the needs of
key stakeholders.449
Aside from the role of laws and norms in enhancing cybersecurity,
the competitive market also plays a critical role in polycentric
governance. While firm leaders such as Microsoft, Google, and
Facebook have built proactive methods for threat management, these
voluntary mechanisms have inherent limitations.450 For example,
other companies with more lax security can become free riders who
increase the risk of attacks on other stakeholders. Cyber-risk
mitigation strategies favored by the U.S. Congress, such as cyber-risk
insurance, can help firms limit their exposure in the event of a data
443. Id.
444. Id. at 205.
445. Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules for Cyber Security, SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY,
June–July 2011, at 119, 123–26 (advocating for better cooperation between public
and private institutions, national governments, and international organizations, and
providing a draft list of norms).
446. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 214, at 10.
447. See Blake Williams, Developing Norms, Deterring Terrorism Expected Topics of
NATO’s Difficult Cybersecurity Discussion, MEDILL NAT’L SEC. ZONE (May 9, 2012),
http://nationalsecurityzone.org/natog8/developing-norms-deterring-terrorism-expected
-topics-of-natos-difficult-cybersecurity-discussion (discussing NATO’s hope to develop
common cyberdefenses that each alliance member will strive to maintain); see also
PRICE & VERHULST, supra note 327, at 22 (arguing in the domestic context for codes of
conduct to be adopted “to ensure that Internet content and service providers act in
accordance with principles of social responsibility”).
448. Martha Finnemore, Cultivating International Cyber Norms, in 2 AMERICA’S CYBER
FUTURE, supra note 33, at 87, 90 (emphasis omitted).
449. See Timothy Farnsworth, China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2012, at 35, 35–36 (discussing a proposal by the Russian and
Chinese governments for an international code of conduct for information security
that drew criticism from current and former U.S. officials).
450. See Scott Dynes et al., Cyber Security: Are Economic Incentives Adequate?, in CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 15, 21 (Eric Goetz & Sujeet Shenoi eds., 2008).
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breach,451 but can do little to enhance overall cybersecurity absent a
proactive strategy that infuses best practices.452 Strengthening the
DHS Homeland Security Enterprise with deeper public-private
partnerships453 and expanding DHS and FBI training sessions for
managers may also be helpful because doing so would better educate
corporate leadership and policymakers about the nature and extent
of the cyberthreat.454 Such efforts could potentially be based on the
Addressing
DoD’s Enduring Security Framework program.455
technical vulnerabilities need to be utilized alongside effective publicprivate partnerships and market-based incentives such as tax breaks
for enhancing security,456 given the rapid advance of disruptive
technologies.
Technical vulnerabilities make up a key component of the
cyberthreat. Best practices must be implemented at each layer of the
Internet’s architecture to address it from the bottom-up since each
layer only uses functions from the layer below, exporting
“functionality to the layer above.”457 Better quality control and supply
chain management is critical for the physical layer. Requiring U.S.
government contracts for computer hardware to be domestically
sourced, for example, would be one step in this direction. Since the

451. See, e.g., HOUSE CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 246, at 14
(recommending an anonymous reporting mechanism to facilitate a better means of
evaluating risk).
452. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TRIAL BY FIRE: WHAT GLOBAL EXECUTIVES
EXPECT OF INFORMATION SECURITY—IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WORLD’S WORST ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN IN THIRTY YEARS 30 (2009), https://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/informationsecurity-survey/pdf/pwcsurvey2010_report.pdf (describing the differences in
budgetary cybersecurity practices between surveyed North American and Asian firms).
453. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE CYBER FUTURE: THE
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE A-4 (2011),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd/blueprint-for-a-secure-cyberfuture.pdf.
454. See Examining the Homeland Security Impact of the Obama Administrations
Cybersecurity Proposal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 9 (2011)
(statement of Melissa E. Hathaway, President, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC)
(suggesting that a training program for corporate leadership about how to mitigate
the risk of cyberattacks may prove helpful).
455. See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec
/lynn-article1.aspx (last visited June 15, 2013) (stating that corporate executives
meet regularly with Defense Department officials through the Enduring Security
Framework to exchange information and discuss how to better meet the
cyberthreat).
456. See HOUSE CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 246, at 8 (advocating for the
expansion and/or extension of existing tax credits, such as the research and
development tax credit, to encourage investment in cybersecurity).
457. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 43.
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industry does not yet exist to support U.S. government needs, longterm commitments should be made to U.S. firms both to enhance
cybersecurity and catalyze economic growth.458 Research must be
undertaken to understand the benefits and drawbacks of different
security measures like DNSSEC, which is a protocol to enhance
security for the logical infrastructure, such as through a National
Science Foundation grant competition.459
Vulnerabilities in
underlying code may also require more comprehensive attention
such as through mandatory automatic updating, while better
education of users is vital to limiting the effectiveness of social
engineering attacks. But focusing solely on code could create
regulatory conflict absent a wider discussion about the role of selforganization so critical to the polycentric thesis.460
Online communities play an integral role in effectively securing
cyberspace. These communities come in many forms, ranging from
commercial organizations like eBay to creative communities like
Wikipedia.461 Professor Murray describes communities such as eBay
as “Lockean” because users have given over some power to a central
administrator in exchange for regulated markets or in this context
cybersecurity. In these communities, democratic governance can coexist with an established authority, such as by empowering users to
police and report errant behavior.462 This state of affairs may be
compared to so-called “Rousseauen communities” in which power
However, such groupings are often
remains decentralized.463
ineffective, because they are “simply too large and too diverse.”464 If,
however, such communities could increase collaboration in the vein
458. See Scott J. Shackelford, How To Enhance Cybersecurity and Create American Jobs,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-jshackelford/how-to-enhance-cybersecurity_b_1673860.html (advocating for the DoD
to make a long-term commitment to U.S. firms to purchase critical electronic
components domestically).
459. See KNAKE, supra note 57, at 26–27 (explaining and advocating for a
competition initiated by the National Science Foundation to foster the development
of secure protocols).
460. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 46 (arguing that the creation of a commons in
the physical infrastructure does not create any regulatory settlement).
461. Id. at 148.
462. Id. at 163. John Locke was a seventeenth century philosopher who is
popularly known as the Father of Liberalism. See generally Michael Welbourne, The
Community of Knowledge, 31 PHIL. Q. 302 (1981).
463. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 163 (comparing online communities with
democratic governance). Jean-Jacques Rosseau was an eighteenth century Genevan
philosopher who argued that individuals are best protected from one another by
forming a moral community of equals. Katrin Froese, Beyond Liberalism: The Moral
Community of Rousseau’s Social Contract, 34 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 579, 581–82 (2001).
464. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 163.
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of IETF working groups, then power need not be centralized to the
degree that it is in Lockean communities such as Facebook. This
decentralized polycentric scheme may be accomplished through
forming even smaller virtual communities such as by making use of
social networking.465 This is consistent with social scientific research
showing that the maximum number of people with whom individuals
maintain social relationships is approximately 150,466 suggesting that
perhaps organizations ranging from the U.S. government to large
corporations should subdivide their workforces into cybersecurity
cohorts. Polycentric theorists including Professor Ostrom have
extolled the benefits of small self-organized communities at
managing common resources.467 But micro-communities⎯like those
focused on a single issue such as P2P file sharing⎯can ignore other
interests, stakeholders, and even the impact of their actions.468 Thus,
cohorts must also have a defined stake in the outcome in order to
effectuate good governance, a goal that can only be accomplished by
educating users about both the cyberthreat to themselves and others
in the network, and their power to help manage it. The Internet is
comprised of both types of communities, but a Lockean hybrid
model favoring organic, bottom-up governance composed of small
cybersecurity cohorts with a role for centralized coordination may be
the most appropriate to enhance security.469 Such self-regulation has
the flexibility “to adapt to rapid technological progress”470 as well as
the potential to be more efficient and cost-effective than command
and control-style regulation.471 As Professor Murray argues: “[I]n
cyberspace the power to decide is, it seems, vested ultimately in the
community. We have the power to control our destiny.”472
465. See The New Politics of the Internet: Everything Is Connected, ECONOMIST (Jan. 5,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21569041-can-internet-activismturn-real-political-movement-everything-connected (reporting on the ideas of
Professor Kevin Werbach who has suggested that the Internet “lowers the barriers to
organization,” potentially to the point that mailing lists could replace painstaking
institution building).
466. See Alberto Hernando et al., Unraveling the Size Distribution of Social Groups with
Information Theory on Complex Networks, 76 EUR. PHYSICAL J. B 87 (2010).
467. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global
Challenges, 284 SCI. 278, 278 (1999) (questioning policymakers’ use of Garrett
Hardin’s theory of the “tragedy of the commons,” in light of the empirical data
showing self-organizing groups can communally manage common-pool resources).
468. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 164 (explaining how members of microcommunities tend to focus only on what directly impacts their own activities).
469. Id.
470. PRICE & VERHULST, supra note 327, at 21.
471. Id. at 21–22.
472. MURRAY, supra note 44, at 125.
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Polycentric analysis provides an avenue to better understand the
regulatory complexity on the Internet and how to model efforts
aimed at enhancing cybersecurity.473 But determining the shape of a
polycentric model is difficult and requires a dynamic view of Internet
governance before effective regulatory interventions may be
undertaken to enhance cybersecurity.474 Such a dynamic model
requires recognition of the large number of regulators, including the
public and private sectors, the plasticity of the environment, and the
“high degree of regulatory competition.”475 Predicting the outcome
of interventions in such a regime complex is undoubtedly difficult, as
seen in the parallel criticisms surrounding ICANN.476 Instead of
external bodies like ICANN being imposed on online communities,
bottom-up regulation in the vein of the IETF could be prioritized to
reinforce best practices such as the NERC standards discussed above.
Disruptive regulation should be minimized, according to Professor
Murray, in favor of complimentary or “symbiotic” interventions that
take into account existing relationships between different
stakeholders.477
While patterns of communications may be easily mapped in an
analog world, in a dynamic digital environment like cyberspace the
patterns are constantly changing. The discipline of system dynamics
helps model complexity, in part by fashioning feedback mechanisms
that help regulations adapt to feedback coming from affected
stakeholders.478 The benefits of such an approach for rapidly
evolving threats like cyberattacks are many and could help to
minimize market distortions resulting from regulatory interventions.
But the political cost of such an approach could be high given that
such a regime would require constant attention, and could increase
uncertainty for firms if regulations regularly changed. These
concerns may be partially assuaged if in return affected industries
enjoyed regular consultation with regulators. Ultimately, system
dynamics teaches us that successful interventions in cyberspace will
require dynamic mapping; analysis of all affected stakeholders; and a
willingness to experiment, identify, and reinforce best practices.
473. See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 49, at 2–3 (discussing some of the benefits and
drawbacks of polycentric governance).
474. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 250 (explaining the dynamic nature of the
regulatory environment, where all parties can act as both regulator and regulatee).
475. Id. at 234.
476. Id. at 234–37.
477. Id. at 243–44.
478. Id. at 249.
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Applying the conceptual framework of polycentric management to
cybersecurity underscores the importance of strengthening mutual
reinforcement “to form an interlocking suite of governance
systems.”479 For example, there is some utility in negotiators focusing
on facets of common problems, such as cybercrime, through targeted
forums with limited membership.480 To oversimplify the points raised
by Professors Ostrom and Victor, among others, policymakers should
start small and local, but need to start somewhere. This framework is
the opposite of the classic approach to commons governance, which
focuses on consensual multilateral U.N. treaties, and could be a more
apt reflection of the current multipolar state of international
relations.481 The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, for
example, already calls for the establishment of sub-regional, regional,
and global cooperation to support its provisions.482 This example
should be followed as policymakers seek to apply polycentric
instruments as a means of strengthening existing, and creating new,
regulatory regimes at multiple levels.483 Such a proposal is in keeping
with the findings of scholars like Professor Christopher Joyner who
have argued for the importance of polycentric partnerships to help
galvanize the political will of states to adhere to the principles laid
out in legal regimes.484 There is some evidence that the Obama
Administration has recognized the importance of coupling national
and international action.485 But, a successful polycentric framework
479. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT, ARCTIC GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF
TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE: CRITICAL QUESTIONS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, WAYS FORWARD
13 (2010), available at http://arcticgovernance.custompublish.com/getfile.php/121955
5.1529.wyaufxvxuc/AGP+Report+April+14+2010%5B1%5D.pdf (discussing the regime
complex comprising Arctic governance).
480. See Cole, supra note 58, at 395–96 (taking a similar approach in the climate
change context in discussing the potential of polycentric governance to better
address the global collective action problem given the slow pace of multilateral
efforts).
481. But see Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
817, 877 (2012) (calling for an international treaty to better manage cyberattacks).
482. UNCLOS, supra note 346, art. 197.
483. See also Cole, supra note 58, at 396 (arguing that “effective global governance
institutions inevitably are ‘polycentric’ in nature[,]” and that “polycentric
governance requires a certain level of independence, as well as interdependence,
between governance institutions and organizations at various levels”). “The key
issue—applicable to climate policy as much as to other areas of global or
international concern—is to determine the appropriate division of responsibility and
authority between governance institutions and organizations at global, national,
state, and local levels.” Id.
484. Christopher C. Joyner, Rethinking International Environmental Regimes: What
Role for Partnership Coalitions?, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 89, 118 (2005).
485. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 447 (noting the Obama Administration’s desire
to create mutually beneficial partnerships with other countries).
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ultimately must address Professor Ostrom’s design principles,
including effective monitoring, graduated sanctions, and efficient
dispute resolution.486
At best, the analytical framework of polycentric management is a
conceptual tool to help understand the dynamic nature of cyberspace
and cybersecurity and how diverse organizations that are multilevel,
multipurpose, multitype, and multisector in scope can work together
to manage common problems.487 Scholars have identified many
preconditions for success, including: (1) affected organizations
recognizing their responsibility for the problem and agreeing on the
need for change, (2) robust information existing regarding the issue
of concern, (3) monitoring being available as a means of ensuring
compliance, and (4) communication occurring among at least some
participants.488 Yet even if all the necessary preconditions were met,
polycentric regulation says relatively little about how to actually
implement needed reforms. Informed experimentation should be
encouraged that makes use of all the modalities of regulation, from
code and market-based incentives, to laws and norms with best
practices subsequently being reinforced at multiple scales489—such
experimentation is at the heart of the Internet’s history and is
essential to enhancing cybersecurity.
CONCLUSION
This Article has engaged the issue of cyberpeace and argued for
the adoption of a culture of cybersecurity in which individuals, firms,
and nations enjoy the benefits of an open and secure Internet.
Needless to say, achieving this goal is easier said than done.
Governance in cyberspace remains weak and fragmented with few
agreed upon rules and fewer still processes to fill in governance gaps.
The international community must come together to craft a common
vision for cybersecurity. Given the difficulties of accomplishing this
goal in the near term, bottom-up governance and dynamic, multilevel
regulation should be undertaken consistent with polycentric analysis.
To this end, the U.S. government must be both a regulator and a
resource to at-risk companies. But neither governments nor the
486. See BUCK, supra note 78, at 31. This wrinkle is explored further in Chapters 2
and 7 of Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search
of Cyber Peace.
487. See McGinnis, supra note 48, at 6–7.
488. Ostrom, supra note 49, at 12–13.
489. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 249 (arguing that regulators need not rely on
“‘trial and error’ regulatory models” if they make use of dynamic modeling tools).
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private sector should be put in exclusive control of managing
cyberspace since such an approach could sacrifice both liberty and
innovation on the mantle of cybersecurity, potentially leading to
neither.
The notion of minimal national government involvement in
Internet governance is being challenged. Internet balkanization is
even a remote possibility.490 Currently, a mixture of soft law, national
regulations, regional accords, customary international law, and
multilateral treaties govern cyberspace, but none alone has the power
or mandate to manage the entirety of cyberspace, and taken together
gaps still persist. From ICANN to the IETF, national governments to
the ITU, differing governance strategies illustrate both the benefits
and drawbacks of polycentric governance. The IETF, for one, may be
considered a model of a successful polycentric system, publishing
standards for Internet governance through a time of explosive
growth, but even it has failed to help widely implement secure
protocols. What hope is there then for cyberpeace, and what might it
look like?
The World Federation of Scientists first put forward the concept of
cyberpeace during a program at the Vatican’s Pontifical Academy of
Sciences in December 2008.491 After this conference, the “Erice
Declaration on Principles for Cyber Stability and Cyber Peace” (Erice
Declaration) was published.492 The Erice Declaration called for
enhanced cooperation and stability in cyberspace through instilling
six lofty principles ranging from guaranteeing the “free flow of
information” to forbidding exploitation and avoiding cyberconflict.493
Each principle is controversial to one group or another. What might
a more nuanced view of cyberpeace resemble? First, stakeholders
must recognize that cyberpeace requires not only addressing
cyberwar, but also cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberespionage.
Taking each in turn, it is unlikely that a multilateral accord will be
negotiated to deal explicitly with cyberwar doctrines or cyberweapons
490. See Marietje Schaake, Stop Balkanizing the Internet, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2012,
10:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marietje-schaake/stop-balkanizing-theinternet_b_1661164.html (decrying the growing number of authoritarian countries that
have sought to monitor and restrict access to the internet).
491. Jody R. Westby, Conclusion, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE, supra note 35, at
112, 112.
492. See WORLD FED’N OF SCI., ERICE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES FOR CYBER
STABILITY AND CYBER PEACE (2009), available at www.ewi.info/system/files/Erice.pdf
[hereinafter ERICE DECLARATION].
493. Id.; Henning Wegener, A Concept of Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER
PEACE, supra note 35, at 77, 79–80.
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for the foreseeable future.494 States may, however, begin the process
of limiting the escalation of cyberwar through norm building. Likeminded groups of nations and key industry players could come
together to form a “Cybersecurity Forum” to negotiate targeted
measures addressing common problems. Such limited groupings
could help bypass some of the issues with consensus-based
rulemaking, though political divides would remain prevalent.495
Cyberterrorism remains a nascent threat,496 but ensuring that it stays
that way requires many of the same responses discussed above,
including close collaboration between law enforcement communities
as well as infiltrating non-state networks.497 Tackling cyberespionage
internationally is even more delicate, but the tipping point might be
reached where nations begin to cooperate—in fact, there is some
evidence that this may already be happening.498
Ultimately, as was discussed in Part I, parsing cyberattacks by
category is an insufficient means of achieving cyberpeace due, in
part, to problems of overlap. Instead, a polycentric approach is
required that recognizes the dynamic and interconnected nature of
cyberspace, the degree of national and private sector control of this
plastic environment, and a recognition of the benefits of bottom-up
action. Local self-organization, however, even by groups that enjoy
legitimacy, can be insufficient to ensure the implementation of best
practices.499 There is thus also an important role for regulators,500
494. See Nye, supra note 156, at 19 (arguing that differences in norms between
countries and the difficulty of verification impede formal treaties).
495. However, there are both moral and political problems with this approach,
including an application of Garrett Hardin’s “lifeboat ethics,” and an unwillingness of
some states to be politically pressured in the smaller forums. See Garrett Hardin,
Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept. 1974, at 38–40,
123–24, 126, available at http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Hardin.pdf
(examining, from an ethical viewpoint, when swimmers surrounding a lifeboat should
be taken aboard).
496. See, e.g., Assessing The Threat of Cyberterrorism, NPR (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123531188 (discussing the
increasingly sophisticated malicious cyberactivity occurring and the danger that
threat poses).
497. NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 5, at 313–15.
498. See Richard Esposito, ‘Astonishing’ Cyber Espionage Threat from Foreign Governments:
British Spy Chief, ABC NEWS (June 25, 2012, 9:17 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/
astonishing-cyberespionage-threat-foreign-governments-british-spy-chief/story?id=16645
690#.T-vyFXBvDL2 (noting that the United States, the United Kingdom, and some other
European allies have begun to coordinate in an effort to combat cyberespionage by
China); US Accuses China Government and Military of Cyber-Spying, BBC (May 7, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22430224.
499. See NYE, supra note 79, at 15 (arguing that the conditions that Professor
Ostrom associates with self-governance “are weak in the cyber domain because of the
large size of the resource, the large number of users, and the poor predictability of
system dynamics (among others)”). The growing enclosure of cyberspace that
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who should use a mixture of laws, norms, markets, and code501 bound
together within a polycentric framework to enhance cybersecurity.
Modeling such a dynamic requirement is beyond the scope of this
study but requires an understanding of the stakeholders, the linkages
between them, and ultimately embracing some amount of
uncertainty.502 Dynamic regulation in which all stakeholders are also
regulators both increases the type and number of possible
interventions and complicates the task of enhancing cybersecurity.
While harmony may be found even within chaotic systems503 ⎯such
as through developing new tools to model the multidimensional
effects of regulations and fine-tuning them as necessary⎯where does
that leave our discussion of cyberpeace? What is the best that we can
reasonably hope for in terms of Internet “peace” even if such an
effective polycentric system were enacted?
States will continue to engage in cyberespionage so long as it is
such an effective tool for intelligence gathering. A tiered approach
to cybercrime should be implemented. Step one would require
enhanced public-private and private-private information sharing to
find trends in the data. Step two would then seek to stabilize and
then gradually reduce cybercrime levels through budgeting more
resources to law enforcement, stepped up prosecutions, and
incentivizing cyber-risk mitigation strategies to limit exposure and
protect consumers. Targeted forums should be created to manage
the risk of escalation of cyberconflicts, though states must recognize
that cyberattacks will likely be a hallmark of future international
armed conflicts. Military doctrines must be updated accordingly.
Cyberpeace will not mean the absence of cyberattacks or a
“wholesome state of tranquility”;504 rather, cyberpeace may be
considered a system in which the risk of destabilizing cyberconflicts is
minimized, cybercrime is reduced to levels comparable to other
Professor Nye highlights, along with the movement towards smaller virtual
communities could make cyberspace more amenable to self-governance, especially if
more communities adopted a Lockean hybrid model with a defined user pool and a
greater stake in the outcome.
500. It is important to note that polycentric governance is distinct from notions of
network governance, which can “attribute too little importance to central
coordination.” McGinnis, supra note 48, at 8. The trick in the Internet governance
context is balancing multilevel regulations with existing laws and treaties to create an
adaptable and efficient system of governance. Further research is required to better
understand the contours of such a system.
501. See Lessig, supra note 40, at 507–08.
502. See MURRAY, supra note 44, at 252.
503. Id. at 250.
504. Wegener, supra note 493, at 78.
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business risks, and cyber defensive strategies are enhanced to
decrease instances of espionage and limit the spread of terrorism.
To accomplish this goal, by way of conclusion a modification of the
Erice Declaration is proposed consistent with this study’s findings and
is comprised of five main recommendations. First, allies should work
together to develop a common code of conduct that includes
baseline norms, including not unduly limiting certain Internet
freedoms, while negotiations continue on a harmonized global legal
framework.505 Second, governments and CNI operators should
establish proactive, comprehensive cybersecurity policies that meet
best practices and require hardware and software developers to
promote resiliency in their products.506 Third, the recommendations
of technical organizations such as the IETF should be made binding
and enforceable by nations when taken up as industry best practices
to help guard against free riders. Fourth, governments and NGOs
should not only continue to participate in U.N. efforts to promote
global cybersecurity507 and refine multistakeholder Internet
governance, but also form more limited forums to enable faster
progress on core issues of common interest. Finally, training
campaigns and more robust public-private partnerships should be
undertaken to share information and educate stakeholders at all
levels about the nature and extent of the cyberthreat.508 Together,
these polycentric initiatives could help to foster cyberpeace in an age
of cyberconflict.

505. Id. at 79.
506. Id. at 79–80.
507. Id. at 80.
508. See Hamadoun I. Touré, The International Response to Cyberwar, in THE QUEST
FOR CYBER PEACE, supra note 35, at 86, 90.

